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The dramatic growth of the software industry in India has continued past the technology 
and Y2K boom of 2000. According to some sources, India is the second largest exporter of 
software in the world, next to the US. The industry has been growing at over 50 percent per year 
for the past ten years, compared to a global growth rate of about 12 percent, and has emerged as 
the major export earner for the country.  
This study adopts an interpretive case study research methodology in studying this growth, 
and investigating the factors behind it. Interviews conducted in India, and various secondary 
sources including official data, data from industry sources, research articles and trade journal 
reports contributed to this study. 
The contributions of this study lie in bringing further clarity to the role of the Government of 
India in the success of its software industry. This is an area in which many negative things have 
been said about the Government, but few positive things. This study brings to light several 
interesting facts, stories and anecdotal evidence of a positive role that the Government (also) 
played. Its conceptual contribution comes from the application of an OECD model (“Role of 
innovation in ICT in economic growth performance”: OECD, 2000) to this case, providing insights 
into ways of expanding the model.  The study also helps to bring realism to the efforts of 
Governments of different countries in attempting to imitate India’s success. A further contribution of 
this study is an updated assimilation of the history of the Indian software industry, since its 
inception until 2005, and it’s clustering in a few locations.  A model of classifying companies in the 
industry has been developed, called the “Value Pyramid”. Lastly, the study shows how the Silicon 
Valley model of growth was different from the model of growth of Bangalore, India’s Silicon Valley, 
and introduces a figure illustrating Bangalore’s software cluster. 
 vi
The key finding of this study is that contrary to popular perception, the Government of India 
played a significant positive role in the growth of India’s software industry through a three-pronged 
approach of (1) Policy support (2) Infrastructure support and (3) Human resource support; that 
resulted in the growth of clusters of software excellence scattered across India. 
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Today, despite a low literacy rate of 61%, a Human Development Index ranking of 124, an 
Internet penetration of just 1%, and 267 million people below the poverty line, several Indian 
locations are ranked among the world’s leading centres for information and telecommunication 
technologies (ICT)  (UIS, 2005; Arora et al., 2001; Rosenberg, 2002; Roy, 2005). The Indian 
software industry has grown at over 50 percent per year during the 1990s compared to a global 
growth rate of about 12 percent (Bajpai and Shastry, 1998) and emerged as a major export earner 
for the country.  This phenomenal growth has continued in recent years despite the global 
economic recession between 2001 and 2003. In 1985, the industry exported software and services 
worth US$ 24.51 million; in 2003-2004, a total export of US$ 12.5 billion was achieved and it is 
expected that during 2004-2005, software exports will be worth US$ 16.3 billion (NASSCOM). 
Foreign investment flows in, as the world takes greater interest in India, whether it is from AOL, 
Dell, Compaq, IBM, Deutsch Bank, or Microsoft. A report by NASSCOM & McKinsey on India’s IT 
industry (1999) has set a target of US$ 50 billion of annual IT software and services exports to be 
achieved by 2008. Exaggerated in its ambition, the target reflects national expectations of the 
industry.  Given this performance and the expectations of the industry, it is not surprising that 
Lawrence Klein, an Economics Nobel Laureate, included India in his list of three countries (cited in 
Ein-Dor, et al., 1997) that are capable of sustained economic growth based on the premise that 
productivity increase in Information Technology can fuel economic growth (the two other countries 
being Israel and Ireland1).  
                                                
1
 Dr Lawrence Klein, in email correspondence, indicates that all three of the I’s (India, Ireland, 
Israel) “benefit greatly because of the role of English in their advanced educational systems”. 
2This success seems incredible given the political and economic history of the country over 
the past 50 years.  The history is characterized by instability (one government lasted for less than 
14 days), lack of direction, coalition governments, and confrontation among political parties. The 
past decade has seen six governments, four prime ministers, one war, a nuclear test, rise in 
aggressive federalism and several financial scandals of staggering proportion. The people’s 
perception of government and public administration is negative. Successive governments have 
lacked vision when it came to the role of technology in the future of the country; and where they did 
not lack vision, they lacked relevance. There is a wide gap between policy making and policy 
implementation, and no efforts are made to bridge this gap. The infrastructure—physical, 
telecommunications, and particularly power—continues to be substandard. Public administration is 
sluggish and economic reforms have proven conducive to corruption (Roy, 2005). Over the years 
India has earned the dubious distinction of being one of the most corrupt countries, with a rank of 
90 out of 146 countries (Roy, 2005; Transparency International, 2005) and the most bureaucratic 
(Roy, 2005).  Politicians are known to buy votes and Politics functions on a system of patronage 
(Transparency International, 2005: Country Report, India). Some western observers have called 
India a functioning anarchy. 
 
1.2 Motivation for the study 
Emergence of India as a world class software powerhouse amidst this extreme democracy 
and anarchy confounds observers and raises some interesting questions. Is the growth of the 
industry for real? What are the drivers and success factors of this growth? Is this growth 
sustainable? What role, if any, has the government played in this growth?  
Role of government in the growth of India’s software industry is an interesting research 
topic for several reasons. First, some studies (Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998; Ein-Dor, et al., 1997) 
are focused on developed economies and hardware with the software aspect of the industry not 
3being studied in detail.  Second, prior studies on the industry dwell on specific success factors such 
as human resources (Fernandes, 2001), or market forces (Bresnahan et al, 2001), without 
adequately discussing the Government’s role in these. Third, while some studies (notably Heeks, 
1996) do cover the role of Government, they often describe the Government’s role as being largely 
limited to ineffectual policy-making or “benign neglect” (Singh, 2003; Arora et al., 2001). 
Interestingly, our preliminary interviews suggested that this was not the case. Fourth, according to 
prior studies, governments have played a key role in the rapid growth of industries, especially in 
Japan and the Asian Tiger economies (Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998; Liu, 2001). Yet, in India, 
successive governments have regulated and constrained private industries. As N. Vittal (Secretary, 
Department of Electronics, Government of India) put it in a letter to us, “The approach of the 
Government was dominated by the controls culture which was typical of the Government of India’s 
approach to industry. Thanks to Nehruvian Socialism, the approach of the government was to 
control the commanding heights of the economy.”2 These reasons made “Role of Government” a 
particularly interesting study. 
 
1.3 Contributions of the study 
The contributions of this study lie in bringing further clarity to the role of the Government of 
India in the success of its software industry. This is an area in which many negative things have 
been said about the Government. This study brings to light interesting facts, stories and anecdotal 
evidence of a positive role that the Government (also) played. Its conceptual contribution comes 
from the application of an OECD model (“Role of innovation in ICT in economic growth 
performance”: OECD, 2000) to this case, providing insights into ways of expanding the model. The 
                                                
2
 Vittal cites two examples: “(1) In addition to prohibitive set-up fees to export software (TI paid US$ 
1m per year for connectivity), there were procedural issues such as the requirement that an 
Engineer of DoE (Department of Electronics) check five minutes of the transmission each day. (2) 
The criteria for eligibility to Software Technology Parks were devised in a way that neutralized the 
cost advantages of the Indian companies, thereby eroding their competitiveness.” 
4study also helps to bring realism to the efforts of Governments of different countries in attempting 
to imitate India’s success. A further contribution of this study is an updated assimilation of the 
history of the Indian software industry, since its inception until 2005, and it’s clustering in a few 
locations.  A model of classifying companies in the industry has been developed, called the “Value 
Pyramid”. Lastly, the study shows how the Silicon Valley model of growth was different from the 
model of growth of Bangalore, India’s Silicon Valley, and introduces a figure illustrating Bangalore’s 
software cluster.  
 
1.4 Thesis organization 
The thesis is organized as follows— 
- Chapter 1 introduces the thesis topic, highlights the motivation for the study, and discusses its 
contribution.  
- Chapter 2 is a literature review, covering role of government in promoting the Software 
Industry, identifying an appropriate model that can be used to study this role, and cluster 
theory.  
- Chapter 3 details the research methodology used in this study. 
- Chapter 4 gives a background of the case.  
- Chapter 5 details the findings on the Role of Government in policy, infrastructure and human 
capital support; the enhanced OECD model is developed and explained in this chapter, and 
used as a framework for analysis. The role of clusters is also described here. 
- Chapter 6 draws out the conclusion, discusses the theoretical and practical implications, the 
limitations of the study, and makes suggestions for future work. 
 
  
5Chapter 2: Literature 
Review 
There is an abundance of literature on the Indian software industry (see for example D’Costa and 
Sridharan, 2004) and software industries of other developing nations (for example, the entire issue 
of EJISDC, 2003). The literature that was reviewed covered such studies, especially those that 
discuss success factors and the role that the Government played. Two principal streams of 
literature emerged: studies that identified factors for success including Government (see for 
example Heeks and Nicholson, 2002), and studies that discussed the clustered nature of the 
industry and its consequent success (see for example Saxenian, 2002).  
 
2.1 Literature on role of Government in the success of the 
software industry 
Government has been listed as one of the possible factors behind the success of software 
industries alongside other factors such as demand and connection with international markets 
(Heeks and Nicholson, 2002; Bresnahan et al., 2001), national vision and strategy (Porter, 1990; 
Tessler et al., 2003), software industry characteristics (Arora et al., 1999; Saxenian, 1994), 
domestic input factors/infrastructure including human capital (Fernandes, 2001; Oberoi, 1991; 
Arora et al., 2000) and low entry barriers (Chandrashekhar, 2002). Tessler et al. (2003) identify the 
Government of India’s role in building the Indian software industry as combining on-site labor with 
offshore outsourcing facilities, investing in telecom and computing infrastructure, and quality 
certification to establish credibility. Carmel (2003a) identifies Governments in general as being a 
factor in the success or failure of an industry, in addition to being capable of playing a proactive or 
6facilitative role in seven other factors (Government vision and policy, human capital, quality of life, 
wages, industry characteristics such as clustering and specialization, capital, technology 
infrastructure, and ‘linkages’). On the other hand Wallsten (2001) studies some of the important 
factors such as public funding, Government subsidies, and establishment of technology 
infrastructure in the nature of ‘science parks’, and finds that although these are popular methods to 
catalyse industry clusters, there is no evidence of their ability to deliver industry success.  
In Heeks’ (1996) seminal work on the role of the Government in India’s IT industry, he 
identifies their involvement as being one of “benign neglect”. Evans (1992, 1997) discusses the 
role of the government-state in promoting industry in general, and uses the Indian software industry 
as an example. Tessler et al. (2003) observes the role of Government as being two-pronged: to 
help create a domestic market, and (together with the private sector) to invest in education, 
infrastructure and other determinants. Kumar and Joseph (2004) identify the role of the ‘National 
Innovation System’ (NIS) in policy-making, infrastructure support and human resource creation, 
describing the need to see India’s success in the context of the 50-year role played by India’s 
National Innovation System. 
Carmel (2003b) suggests that the export industry has a greater capacity for generating 
spillovers than the domestic industry and, as Hanna et al. (1995) and others also suggest, that the 
Government should focus on the domestic industry in order to develop backward linkages into the 
economy, as this will in turn improve the overall competitiveness of the industry (Schware, 1992; 
Porter, 1990). Joseph (2002) too discusses the need for Government to focus policy directives 
towards building the domestic market. Desai (2000) details the different carrots offered by the 
Government of India to its IT industry, and warns against this approach as being detrimental to 
economic stability. 
Research that sought to explain the parallel success of industries in Israel and Ireland was 
also studied (see for example de Fontenay and Carmel, 2002; Green, 2000; Arora et al., 2000; 
Crone, 2002; Tessler et al., 2003). These cases were found to be quite different as the focus of 
7these countries is on products and high-end services. The reasons attributed to the success of 
these industries also differed: the Government was seen to be a clear and proactive player with a 
number of clearly directed and supportive policies being implemented. In the case of Israel, funding 
and other forms of state support, mandatory military service and the country’s strength in military 
research, the influx of Jewish immigrants (especially from the scientist-rich USSR), and linkages 
with the US market are seen to be key factors. In the case of Ireland, success factors included a 
Government campaign to dramatically increase Foreign Direct Investment (Irish companies 
captured 23% of all FDI projects in Europe in 1997, for instance), a huge increase in Government 
funding as part of its National Development Plan (2000-2006), and supportive policies designed 
over decades to develop its “knowledge economy” (in the context of EU membership) including 
investment in technology education.  
 
2.2 Literature on success of the software industry as 
interpreted by Cluster Theory 
Some researchers use cluster theories in offering an explanation for the success of the 
Indian software industry. Many cities around the world are evidence of the influence a particular 
location has in gravitating businesses operating in a specific industry towards it. There are two 
main theories that seek to explain this phenomenon: agglomeration, and clustering. Krugman 
(1991) is representative of the Marshallian (1920) view on agglomeration, and describes the 
formation of a cluster evolving around a historical “accident” that then gives way to self-reinforcing 
dynamics—the larger or more dynamic the cluster is, the larger and more dynamic it gets (the 
accident no longer playing its role) until other factors take over to limit its growth and/or dynamism 
(negative externalities arising due to congestion). Other reinforcing elements include supplier-
consumer interactions leading to greater productivity, and all these are catalyzed by a relatively 
free flow of information between parties with various but related interests within the context of the 
8ecosystem—industry, research centers and universities, and both formal and informal interaction 
between people (Romer, 1986; Saxenian, 1994).  
Porter (1998) on the other hand, maintains that clusters are a key component of a region’s 
comparative and/or competitive advantage and that for competitive advantage to be built and 
sustained, the five forces of factor conditions, local demand, related and supporting institutions, 
intensity of competition and national pride play a key role. Porter suggested that such clusters are 
the principal means by which advanced economies are able to create value. Geographical 
proximity amplifies the positive externalities between suppliers, consumers, and supporting 
industries. The special mechanics of a cluster ensure constant improvements in productivity. As 
Porter (1990, p149) says, “The phenomenon of clustering is so pervasive that it appears to be a 
central feature of advanced national economies”.  
Balasubramanyam and Balasubramanyam (2000), Streamlau (1996), Saxenian (2002) and 
Patni (1999) draw parallels between Silicon Valley and Bangalore, attributing the success of the 
Indian software industry chiefly to agglomeration economics. Yet, Tessler et al. (2003) note that 
“cluster-based initiatives should not be government-driven, but rather the result of market-friendly 
approaches.”3 Bresnahan et al. (2001) also find that “directive public-policy efforts to jump-start 
clusters or to make top-down or directive efforts to organize them” do not work, and that the right 
policies do have an element of “benign neglect” (Heeks, 1996).  
While it is clear that the software industry in India does bear evidence to the adage “nothing 
succeeds like success”, describing the phenomenon of a cluster, this raises some confusion about 
the role of Government in the success of the Indian software industry. One set of studies suggests 
that Government can play a positive role in creating the determinants for success, while largely 
ambivalent about the effectiveness of the Government of India. Another set of studies suggests a 
hands-off role for Governments to play, and even criticizes the efficacy of direct involvement. After 
                                                
3
 Tessler et al. (2003) add the caveat that “Governments have discovered belatedly in Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, and elsewhere, that neither government decree nor investment in real estate 
necessarily creates a cluster 
9all, cluster theory suggests that either a cluster emerges by accident (and then succeeds) or it 
emerges subsequent to the success of the industry. Did clusters in the Indian software industry 
emerge subsequent to its success, or alongside it? What was the role of the Government in this 
process?  
This study draws out the role of the Government, demonstrating its part in creating clusters 
of excellence in the Indian software industry. Heeks and Nicholson (2002) point out that there is a 
difference between the initial and succeeding strategies for software industry development. 
Analogously, as discussed in Chapter 5, this study finds that the initial success factor was 
Government-induced cluster development, and the succeeding success factor was the natural 
dynamic of cluster reinforcement.   
 
2.3 Selecting a model for “Role of Government” 
 Several models have been suggested in the literature to study the role of government and 
technology policy in the development and growth of technology industries. Under technology 
policy, King et al. (1992, 1994) include trade policy, foreign investment policy, and support for 
domestic industry, promotion of use, infrastructure development, and industry coordination as 
critical government roles.  Ein-Dor et al. (1997) include government education policies, in addition 
to technology policies.  In a study of role of government in technology development, (Wallsten 
2001) focuses on public venture capital (direct governmental financial support) and science parks.  
de Fontenay and Carmel (2004) find Israel’s success to be largely due to having “…had almost 
none of the government failures of developing countries…that would undermine its comparative 
advantage”. In some Asian Tiger economies, for example Taiwan, governments, industry, and 
universities form a tightly coupled triad with funding and other forms of direct support from 
government (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2000; Liu, 2001). A similar arrangement is suggested in some 
European countries in the triple-helix model (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 2001).  These models 
were studied and found to be less suitable for the context of this study.  
10
Figure 1 shows the model used in this thesis, adopted from the analytical framework of OECD 
to study ‘new economy’ growth and its causes, particularly innovation in ICT (OECD, 2000). The 
study examines the role of innovation in information and communications technologies in recent 
OECD growth performance. The framework consists of three parts: (1) “Proximate” sources of 
growth (competitiveness) such as labor, capital, and productivity (2) Determinants (critical success 
factors) of growth; and (3) Impact of institutional factors (policies) on the determinants of growth.  
While the model was developed to address an economy as a whole, we have adopted it in our 
study of one industry within the economy. The model was selected because of its fit with the 
context (role of government), and the model itself was found to be consistent with our independent 
conclusions through interviews and secondary data. This study discusses the role of the 
Government in driving the determinants (and therefore the proximate sources which result in 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Details of research method 
The case study methodology was adopted in this study. According to Winegardner (2001), 
the end product of a qualitative research process is a document that is “richly descriptive” with 
“words and pictures rather than numbers”. Interviews were open-ended with minimal structure, and 
were conducted over 2001-2004. Initial interviews suggested a positive role played by the 
Government, and this then became the focal point of subsequent interviews. Certain key 
interviewees were interviewed more than once, as the study progressed. The data was then 
aggregated and analyzed, and the findings were subject to review by key interviewees (Yin, 1984, 
1993; Myers, 1997; Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  
The overall research strategy could be categorized as interpretivist; guided by the 
knowledge of reality as socially constructed by individual human actors (Walsham, 1995). An 
interpretivist approach tries to understand the perspective of different actors in a situation, without 
trying to give the status of "truth" to one interpretation over another. Instead, the approach was to 
try to understand the multiple perspectives presented, and to understand why the interpretation of 
one person differed from another's on similar issues (e.g.; the impact of Government-funded 
‘marketing trips’ to Europe).  
Initially, a series of interviews were conducted with professionals within the industry who 
have been involved since its inception. The background of the study was introduced as 
investigating reasons behind the success of the industry, the word ‘success’ being open for 
discussion during the interview. This ensured that these initial interviews stayed open-ended. A 
variety of reasons were drawn out, and these largely corroborated with existing discussions in the 
literature. When questioned on the importance and nature of the role of Government, each 
 13
interviewee had a unique opinion and anecdotal evidence to support that opinion. This made role 
of Government an interesting aspect to explore further into.  
Prior to the next set of interviews, secondary research was conducted on the role of 
Government in the Indian software industry. This consisted of reading various trade journals, 
research articles, newspaper clippings, magazines, NASSCOM reports, Government documents, 
and online articles/commentaries. The key Government departments involved were the DoE and 
the IT departments in each state. The Secretary of the department is the person who has a holistic 
view of all the intentions and actions of that department, during his/her time in office, and hence, 
two former Secretaries from the Department of Electronics (Central Government function) and the 
IT Secretary (for the State of Andhra Pradesh) were interviewed. Since several interviewees 
indicated that the Indian Railways computerization project played an important role in the growth of 
the software industry, the then General Manager of the Railways (South) was included in the list of 
interviewees.  
As the study progressed, it became clear that human capital was seen as a critical success 
factor for the industry, and also that the Government had played a significant role here. In order to 
verify this, eminent academicians in the Science and Technology areas, as well as individuals who 
played a part in the drafting of Science and Technology education policies were interviewed. In 
addition, the Directors of various institutions for technological education were interviewed for 
‘insider views’ on the supply and demand dynamics of human capital for the software industry.   
From the industry, interviewees were selected based on the status of the company within 
the industry (e.g. Infosys is seen as a pioneer), their contribution to the industry (e.g. as an industry 
forum leader), their unique perspective of the industry (e.g. firm specializing in recruitment for 
software companies), and their orientation (e.g. both product and service companies). Only 
CEO/board-level professionals were considered, as the likelihood that they would have a holistic 
view of the industry is higher. With the industry professionals, interviewees usually assisted us in 
identifying other individuals who they felt would have relevant insights and experiences to share. 
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For example, Mr. Narayanmurthy (Chairman, Infosys) introduced us to Mr. Vittal (Secretary, DoE) 
to learn more about the role of Government during his tenure.  
For independent companies the starting-up phase and subsequent phases in the growth of 
companies were considered. For the other companies, the various stages of movement up the 
value chain were discussed, particularly events that gave impetus to these changes. Interviews 
started with the origin and background of the interviewees, the conditions in which they selected (or 
found themselves in) the software industry, their educational and professional experience up until 
that point, and their initial and subsequent strategies as far as their company/institution/body was 
concerned. The role of the Government, if any, was considered throughout the interview.  
I carefully documented my thoughts and reflections in relation to the case and related 
findings to the conceptual framework (Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 1998). Interviews were 
conducted largely in English, usually at the office of the interviewee (though sometimes in cafes 
and restaurants), and typically lasted for two to three hours. Notes were made during the meetings, 
and these were reviewed as soon as possible afterwards, and interpretations were refined. Follow-
up phone calls were made in some cases to clarify certain points.  
The guidelines for conducting and evaluating an interpretive study are well described in 
Klein and Myers (1999), who list seven principles, and I discuss these next.  
As a researcher, I have a preference for the development and harmonization of concepts, 
rather than empirical verification. I have a strong preference for the human side of the story, and to 
introduce or integrate multiple perspectives. I prefer to argue why a particular hypothesis ought to 
be considered, rather than seeking to test a particular hypothesis. This makes my work vulnerable 
to criticism from a positivist standpoint, as it is not statistically robust. I view the richness and 
broadness of perspective that such a study brings as being its key strength. 
The principle of the hermeneutic circle is very much prevalent in my study, in the attempt to 
bring clarity to the context through repeated, iterative, examinations of both the parts (analyses of 
interviews and data) and the whole (the software industry). In particular, the process of resolving 
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the different opinions expressed by interviewees, the wealth of prior research on the topic, and my 
own analysis, proved to be particularly iterative. The hermeneutic cycle, as Klein and Myers (1999), 
describe, is indeed applied at each and every step along the way, and incorporates every other 
principle.  
My understanding of (us) Indians is that we are not prone to flattering our Government. As 
an Indian discussing the subject with other Indians, I found the discussion often veering towards a 
general criticism of the Government. Keeping in mind the principle of suspicion, I remained 
cautious of this in my interviews, since opportunities to criticize the Government are rampant. Yet, 
being excessively focused can cause certain relevant facts to remain hidden and not come to light. 
The dynamics in the interactions between the interviewees (subjects) and I (researcher) have an 
impact on both the data (interviews) as well as the interpretation (analysis). After all, the 
interviewees themselves were participants in the growth of the software industry, and experienced 
the changes within their specific context as experienced from their perspective on life, and they 
recount their experiences through the stained glass of memory. It was useful to question opinions 
expressed by interviewees, and ask for factual or anecdotal evidence to support their convictions. 
In the course of conducting my interviews, I realized that to draw out the truth, the interviewer 
requires not just the intellectual rigor of a scientist, but also the open-mindedness of an artist and 
the patience of a saint.   
The background of the case is described in detail in Chapter 4, adhering to the principle of 
contextualization. In terms of role of Government, the study discusses both the role played in the 
incipient stages of the industry and the role the Government now plays. Since the subject concerns 
the success of the industry, the study focuses on the earlier years, when decisions had maximum 
impact. In a way the entire study is one of contextualization—putting the role of the Government in 
the context of the subsequent success of the industry.  
The principle of interactions between the researchers and the subjects, as well as the 
principal of dialogical reasoning was fundamental to this study. My initial sense from my personal 
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knowledge framework (having grown up in India, and being co-founder of a multinational company 
with a software development centre in Bangalore, India) was that the Government role was one of 
benign neglect (at best). This was supported by my initial study of the literature available on the 
subject. When I embarked on this study, I wasn’t certain what the reasons for the success of the 
industry were, and while I could suggest a few factors, Government did not figure strongly as one 
of them. As the study progressed, particularly the interviews, I had to question this preconception. 
It became evident from interviewees, many of whom have been in the industry since its inception, 
that the Government perhaps had more to do with the industry’s success than I was initially willing 
to concede. Having to negotiate through contrasting facts and differences of opinions, while 
influencing and being influenced by the interviewees, led me to a richer understanding of the 
industry. The study highlights the constructive actions of the Government of India in building the 
country’s software industry. Since the contrasting view is that the Government did nothing (“benign 
neglect”), there is not very much to discuss in terms of dialogical reasoning in this specific sense. 
The principle of multiple interpretations is particularly clear in this case. The Government 
has traditionally been seen in its role as inhibitor to success rather than facilitator, and as the study 
progressed, there were a multitude of different perspectives, both factual and anecdotal, that led to 
multiple possible interpretations. In a case as controversial as this, one almost runs a risk in 
drawing any conclusion. The key point I kept in mind is that one is required to have sensitivity to 
multiple interpretations, and that it is entirely possible to draw a conclusion that may not be 
consistent with one or more interpretations, and yet includes them in the analysis. As part of the 
hermeneutic cycle, I visited key interviewees more than once during the course of the study. At 
times, an interviewee shared a perspective on a certain aspect of the industry, and at other times 
the same interviewee shared a different perspective on the same aspect. In all likelihood, this was 
also due to my understanding of the subject evolving as the study progressed.  
In studying the role of Government in the success of the industry, the cluster/agglomeration 
theory kept arising, which led me to study the literature on cluster theory and to search for an 
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appropriate framework (discussed in Chapter 2). I felt it vital to harmonize these frameworks. Doing 
so has, I believe, led to an important abstraction: that Governments do have a role to play in cluster 
formation. The study provides an example of a new way in which the OECD (2000) model for 





Chapter 4: Case Description 
and Analysis 
 
This chapter is an outcome of my research; based on secondary sources including journal articles, 
trade magazines, industry websites, newspaper articles, and books on the subject; as well as on 
interviews conducted between 2001-2004. The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of 
India as well as a detailed background of its software industry. As such, this chapter is a 
contribution of this thesis, in terms of an updated description of the state of the industry. Figure 8 in 
this chapter, the “Value Pyramid”, represents another contribution of this thesis, illustrating the 
competency of Indian firms at different points along the value chain. 
 
4.1 The Country 
4.1.1 DEMOGRAPHICS 
India is a large, diverse and under-developed country with a bureaucratic and corrupt 
Government, ranked 90th out of 146 countries (Roy, 2005). Home to 16% of the world’s total 
population, it occupies just 2.42% of the world’s total land area. As of 2005, approximately 39% of 
its adult population (over the age of 15) is illiterate (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2005). 
Fragmentation exists at many levels: the country is divided into 28 states and 7 union territories 
(Figure 2), over 1027 million people (2001 census) are spread over 3.3 million square kilometers, 
speak 18 major languages with 844 dialects, and practice Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, 
Sikhis, Jainism, Judaism, Zoroastrianism amongst a host of other lesser-known religions4. The 




success of the country’s software industry is all the more surprising given its fragmented, diverse, 
nature.  
 





4.1.2 COMPLEX SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE 
The political climate in India is characterized by instability. Although the term of 
Government is 5 years, this is rarely the case. India had six-month governments, three-month 
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governments and at one point, even a two-week government5. There have been seventeen 
governments in the past fifty years, an average of less than three years each. Apart from the first 
government (1947-1964) led by Jawaharlal Nehru, the average life of the government has been 
two years and four months before they are forced to resign.  
The system of government in the states closely resembles that of the Union. The State 
Executive consists of the Governor and a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at its head. 
The President appoints the Governor of the State for a term of five years. The Governor functions 
as a figurehead, similar to the President. The Council of Ministers is responsible to the Legislative 
Assembly of the state, which consists of the Governor and one House or two Houses. It is a 
complex system of governance! India recently completed its general elections to elect its 14th Lok 
Sabha. At the 2004 general elections, there were 7 National parties and 55 State parties. These 
parties are ambiguously and complexly inter-twined. A true democracy; people of foreign origin, 
bus conductors, movie stars and bandit queens figure prominently in Indian politics.  
It must be noted that at each and every one of these levels, the parties in power may be, 
and consistently are, different. Indeed even at a particular level it is seldom that any one party 
holds majority, it is usually a fragile alliance of two or more parties (“coalition governments”). The 
last two governments have been coalition governments with no single party succeeding in getting a 
simple majority. The newly formed Government includes parties that aligned themselves to the 
present Opposition during their rule in the previous term. With the current Government being 
supported by the Left, differences over economic policy have already begun to emerge. Due to this 
fragility, governments at the Centre and many states are inherently unstable. This limits the 
desirability for long-term strategic improvements to the nation, and encourages short-term vote-
pulling measures. Infused with different agendas, new governments often steer in tangents to the 
paths treaded by previous governments.  
                                                
5
 Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Government: 16 May 1996 - 01 June 1996 
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Each of these many layers of government has its own sphere of power and responsibilities, 
and interference between layers is restricted by the Constitution. Thus, cohesiveness of national 
purpose and synergy of undertakings is difficult to achieve and India lags well behind countries with 
more stable governments, such as The Peoples’ Republic of China, in most development indexes 
(Table 1), per capita GDP and importance of high-technology exports. Yet, India’s software 
industry is far more developed than is China’s (Business Week, 2005; Saran, 2005; The 
Economist, 2005), and this raises interesting questions about role of Government.  
 
Table 1: India and China: A comparison (2003) 
 
Indicator Unit India China 
Population Million 1064.4 1288.4 
Birth rate Per 1000 24 15 
Death rate Per 1000 8 8 
Infant mortality rate Per 1000 live births 63 30 
Life expectancy at birth Years 63.42 70.8 
Adult literacy rate (2005, estimate*) % 61.1 90.9 
Internet users Per 1000 people 17.49 63.25 
Fixed line and mobile phone 
subscribers Per 1000 people 71.03 423.8 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows US$ 4,269,000,000 53,504,999,424
GDP growth Annual % 8.61 9.3 
GNI per capita, Atlas method US$ 540 1100 
High-technology exports 
As a % of 
manufactured exports 4.75 27.1 
 




* Literacy statistics were found to vary depending on the source. The figures chosen are the 
national estimates provided in 2005, and approved by the UIS. These figures more-or-less tally 




4.2 The industry 
4.2.1 OVERVIEW 
A World Bank funded study conducted over a decade ago (World Bank, 1992) to discuss Indian 
software strategies identified that companies in the US preferred to get their software developed in 
India for its high quality and relatively low cost advantage. Fourteen years later, this remains 
unaltered. As of 2004, more than 255 of the Fortune 500 companies were outsourcing their 
software development requirements to India (NASSCOM), both for the cost benefit and for the 
quality. While the cost benefits are clearly understood, it must be noted that by this time, 66 Indian 
companies had the unique distinction of being certified at the SEI-CMM Level 5—this out of a total 
of about 150 organizations worldwide6. The Indian software industry has achieved a remarkable 
rate of progress from its beginnings in the 1960’s. Table 2 indicates the growth in software exports 
between 1990 and 2004. 
 




1990-1991 131.2 51% 
1991-1992 173.9 33% 
1992-1993 219.8 26% 
1993-1994 314.0 43% 
1994-1995 480.9 53% 
1995-1996 734 52% 
1996-1997 1083 48% 
1997-1998 1750 62% 
1998-1999 2650 52% 
1999-2000 4000 51% 
2000-2001 6200 55% 
2001-2002 7650 24% 
2002-2003 9545 29% 
2003-2004 12500 31% 
 
Source: NASSCOM; Patibandla et al., 2000; Arora et al., 1999; Heeks, 1998. 
 
                                                
6
   http://www.nasscom.org/artdisplay.asp?Art_id=3212 accessed on March 12, 2005.  
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The software export industry contributes almost 20% of India’s total exports. Compared to the 50% 
compounded annual growth rate of the software industry, the growth rate of the Indian industry 
sector is 7.6%, while the Indian service sector has a growth rate of 8.2%. Table 3 shows the 
ranking of software companies in terms of export revenues. 
 






4.2.2 IT IS A SERVICE INDUSTRY 
The Indian software industry is heavily service oriented. One of the reasons offered for the 
large growth rates associated with the Indian software industry has been its orientation towards 
low-end software services as opposed to products and packages. The “Year 2000 problem” 
resulted in an explosion of services work outsourced to India (cumulative worth of $2 billion, 
according to some sources). This has led to the opinion that Y2K services were one of the major 
drivers of the software industry in India. Heeks (1998) for example, points out that  “the Year 2000 
problem… …now estimated to make up nearly 40% of current software export work from India.” 
According to a NASSCOM survey during 1999-2000 however, solutions for Y2K revenues 
accounted for just about 12 per cent of India’s software export. While revenues from export of Y2K 
Rank 1980-81 1985-86 1989-90 1994-95 1997-98 2000-01 
1 TCS TCS TCS TCS TCS TCS 
2 TUL TUL TUL TUL Wipro Infosys 
3 Computronics PCS COSL Wipro Tata 
Infotech 
Wipro 
4 Shaw Wallace Hinditron Datamatics Pentafour Pentafour Satyam 
5 Hinditron Infosys Texas 
Instruments 





Digital (DEIL) Silverline Satyam Cognizant 
7 ORG DCM DP PCS Fujitsu Tata IBM SilverLine 
8 System COSL Mahindra-BT Digital 
(DEIL) 
CMC Ltd NIIT 
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software solutions were worth US$ 480 million out a of total Indian software exports of US$ 4 billion 
during this period, post-Y2K, the year 2000-2001 recorded a growth of 55% in software exports 
with no reliance on Y2K services. The period did however increase the visibility of the Indian 
software industry and provide an opportunity for firms to ‘get their feet wet’ with outsourcing. Table 
4 lists the revenue position of the top 15 companies in 2001 and in 2004, while Table 5 gives a 
breakdown of software export revenue by type. 
 





















                                                
7
 Note: This list does not include companies, such as Cognizant, which are US-listed but have 
significant offshore operations in India. In 2003-04 for instance, Cognizant recorded revenues that 
would place them 6th on this list were they to be ranked.  




Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) 1 617.6 1198.9 
Infosys Technologies Ltd 2 411.5 1026.0 
Wipro Technologies 3 390.2 854.1 
Satyam Computer Service ltd 4 275.6 538.6 
HCL Technologies Ltd 5 250.4 412.9 
Patni Computer Systems Ltd 6 114.5 266.4 
IFlex Solutions 7 65.11 168.4 
Mahindra British Telecom Ltd 8 99.7 158.5 
Polaris Software 9 - 126.1 
Perot Systems TSI (HCL) 10 97.5 118.6 
Digital Globalsoft Ltd 11 - 117.9 
NIIT Ltd 12 126.6 117.2 
iGate Global Solutions Limited 13 75.5 106.4 
Birlasoft Ltd 14 - 93.1 
Mphasis BFL Ltd 15 62.95 85.5 
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Table 5: Breakdown of Indian Software Exports by Type 
Type Late 1980s % 1990’s % 
Sales of Software packages 1-2 2-5 
Digitization and Data entry < 1 2-4 
Customized conversion work 20-40 
Custom application building 60-80 
  
              
 
Source: Heeks, 1996; NASSCOM 
 
Interviewees identified some of the key differences between services and products in the software 
industry to be: 
1. Products have long term revenue potential while services are billed project by project. 
2. Products have a wider base while services are aimed at a single client/set of clients. 
3. Products have only a 1 - 5% chance of success; hence risk is part of product development.  
Several interviewees were of the opinion that the greater concentration on services as opposed to 
packages is a result of Indian companies lacking the ability to excel in the marketing arena. 
However, one interviewee pointed out that Indians are “not only the top men in technology firms but 
also in marketing firms”, and was of the opinion that what Indian companies lack is not ‘marketing 
skills’ but ‘marketing guts’, suggesting that risk-averseness is a characteristic Indian trait. Other 
suggested reasons for this concentration on services are (Interviews) an under-developed local 
market resulting in inexperience in product development, an unfamiliarity with foreign markets 
fortified by the difficulty to keep up with changing needs and standards due to the distance from 
global markets, insufficient capital to venture into product creation and marketing let alone support, 
maintenance and upgrades, and lack of reputation as a software package source. The importance 
of PR and branding seem to be lost on the Indian software industry as well. An insightful 
suggestion was that the Indian middle-class is not entrepreneurial and software graduates 
(typically middle-class Indians) lacked the gumption to have a “go at it” preferring instead to join 
large companies like the SUN Microsystems and Hewlett-Packards of the world rather than 
software startups.  
95 
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Firms in India sometimes seek to establish a partnership where the Indian company 
manufactures the product according to specifications supplied by the foreign collaborator who 
subsequently markets the product in the foreign market (Interviews). Often, the firms agree to 
undertake software development for the foreign firm, with the implicit agreement that they will try to 
develop the subsequent solution into a product for that niche. This form of software development is 
usually the first (and almost always, the last) step towards product development. For example, Aditi 
Technologies (headquartered in Bangalore) worked on projects for companies like Citicorp and 
Sony, and developed a CRM solution that they turned into a ‘product’ called Tasmay. Tasmay was 
subsequently spun off as a separate entity8. However, the ‘services’ mentality is harder to spin off; 
and today the company provides services that leverage on the developed platform. The go-to-
market approach is thus altogether different from a pure software product player. Other examples 
of similar systems are TCS’s Casepac (Heeks, 1996) and Infosys’s Yantra (an ERP solution which 
was spun off as a separate company9). These are often referred to as “semi-packaged software”. 
Thus, the figure of “2-5%” in Table 5 does not actually refer to shrink-wrapped products, but to 
semi-packaged software. The actual figure for products in the late 1990’s was probably closer to 1-
2% (Interviews), and today the figure may be closer to the 5% mentioned, than it was then (World 
Bank, 1995). Apte (1988) attributes this to an absence of public policy, and a poor ability to 
commercially exploit the quality research work done in the public sector.  
Nevertheless there are remarkable exceptions to this, such as the work done by embedded 
systems companies such as Encore solutions10, whose work in Digital Signal Processing (DSP) 
technologies is recognized worldwide. Companies are beginning to realize the advantage of a 
product-oriented offering as against a service-oriented offering: that income is not directly 
correlated to manpower and “Time and Materials”, but that “revenue is potentially infinite” 
(Interview). Still, few Indian companies have ventured into products as the statistics indicate, and 
                                                
8Interviews, http://www.aditi.com/Homelinks/productdev.htm  
9
 Interviews, www.yantra.com 
10
 www.ncoretech.com  
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the bulk of the Indian companies in services are in lower-end services. Figure 3 shows the 
composition of the Indian software service industry, in 2004, by type of software. 
 
 










India’s major reliance on software service exports has caused India a competitive disadvantage in 
the global market (from a revenue perspective) compared to countries where the industry relies 
less on export of software services and more on export of software products (Chakraborty and 
Dutta, 2002).  
 
 
4.2.3 IT IS AN EXPORT-ORIENTED INDUSTRY 
The late Dewang Mehta, former President of NASSCOM, said, “India will do to software 
what Japan did to the car”. Japan’s automobile industry had its foundations in a strong and 
intensely competitive local market that was protected by the Government from foreign entrants. 
Outgrowing the local market, these companies moved abroad. As we shall see later, the Indian 
Government too created a protectionist environment within the country, stimulated software 
General Software - 33%
IT Enabled Services - 10%
IC Design - 13%
Communication
Software - 10% 
Application Software - 17%
System software - 17% 
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production, and aggressively directed firms towards the export market. Software export has always 
been the predominant focus of the industry, both from the point of view of government policy-
making and the proclivity of the players. Mukhi and Chellam (1988) identified that “for several years 
now the Indian government has been dreaming about Indian software exports overtaking all other 
commodity exports in the service sector”. Table 6 shows the breakdown of software production 
between domestic and export markets. 
 
Table 6: Breakdown of Software Production: Domestic and Export (US$ million) 















Domestic 390 950 1,700 2,400 2,310 2,600 3,400 
Export  734 1,750 4,000 6,200 7,650 9,545 12,500 
Total 1,124 2,700 5,700 8,600 9,960 12,475 15,900 
Domestic/Total 34.7% 35.2% 29.8% 27.9% 23.2% 20.8% 21.4% 
Export/Total 63.4% 64.8% 70.2% 72.1% 76.8% 79.2% 78.6% 
Export/Domestic 188% 184% 235% 271% 331% 380% 367% 
 
Sources: NASSCOM; Patibandla et al., 2000     
 
In fact, while India’s share of the global software market for products and service is 
undoubtedly low (Bajpai and Shastri, 1998, put this number at 0.5%), it enjoys a share reported to 
be as high as 18.2% of the global cross-country customized software market (Tschang, 2001). 
India’s software industry has traditionally been export-oriented. In 1986 there were 50 companies 
involved in export, in 1990 there were 140 such companies (Oberoi and Raghunathan, 1991), in 
1998 there were 716 export companies, 860 in 1999 (Iwami, 2000) and is currently at over 3,000 
(NASSCOM). While Ghemawat and Patibandla (1999) characterize the export industry as an 
“island of competitiveness” and Kohli (1989) says, “There has been an overemphasis on exports 
rather than on building an industry which could meet both internal demands as well as export 
requirements”, these ignore the actual contribution of the industry and the remarkable fact that 
despite not having a strong domestic market, the industry has been a successful exporter. Heeks 
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(1996) quotes an interviewee, “One illusion we must remove from our mind. No industry can really 
export unless you develop a domestic market. If you don’t develop a strong domestic software 
market, how do you expect to export?” However this is not the case for a service-oriented industry 
where skills rather than products are for sale. 
On one hand, researchers such as Heeks (1996) and Balasubramaniam and 
Balasubramaniam (1997) argue that although the weakness of the domestic market in India was 
one of the major reasons for driving companies into the export market, linkages with the domestic 
market reduce weaknesses and improve credibility, skills, product innovation and market 
understanding. On the other hand, researchers such as Ghemawat and Patibandla (1999) suggest 
that “internationally competitive industries in poor countries are more likely to emerge as industries 
characterized by relatively weak inter-industry linkages rather than strong ones; thus strong 
linkages with other domestic industries within an under-developed and generally uncompetitive 
domestic context are more likely to drag down international competitiveness than to increase it”. 
Our interviews suggested that these analyses are constructed within a product-framework rather 
than a service-framework. When the primary resource is human capital as a factor of production, 
and the emphasis on production rather than innovation, the issue of domestic market linkages does 
not arise. 
The US is the dominant destination for India’s software exports. As the largest consumer of 
software in the world (by far), and characterized by a competitive domestic market, the US has a 
great demand for technically skilled personnel and is a major customer for outsourcing. Heeks 
(1998) mentions that Indian companies have exported software to more than 40 countries, but that 
there is a heavy reliance on the US Market. In 1999-2000, software was exported to 95 countries 
around the world and in 2000-01, the number of countries that Indian companies exported software 
to increased to 102. The distribution chiefly migrated towards a greater concentration on USA and 
Europe. With the large number of Non Resident Indians returning to India and setting up 
companies here to address demand in the country they are returning from, the export nature of the 
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industry has further developed. With the growth of ITES and BPO, India’s software exports to the 
US increased in 2002-03. Of India’s ITES/BPO exports, 80-85% are to the US (NASSCOM). 2004 
saw the popularity of business process outsourcing (BPO) growing exponentially. Table 7 shows 
the main markets that India exports software to, while Table 8 contrasts the IT services spending of 
these different markets with India’s share. 
 
Table 7: Destinations of Software Export 
Proportion of Total Software Exports (%) Destination Region 
1980’s-1990’s 1997-98 1999-2000 2000-2001 
USA 60-65 58 62 62 
Europe 20 21 23.5 24 
Japan 0-3 4 3.5 4 
Australia & New Zealand 5-10 2 1.5 
SE Asia 6 3.5 
West Asia 2 1.5 




Total 100 100 100 100 
 




Table 8: IT Services Spending: Regional Shares 2002-2003  
 
 
Source: NASSCOM     
 







Share in India’s 
exports (%) 
North America 171.1 6,462 3.78% 67.7 
Western Europe 109.6 2,033 1.85% 21.3 
Japan 34.9 186.6 0.53% 2 
Latin America & 
Rest of the World 
17.5 563.5 3.22% 5.9 




Table 7 and Table 8 indicate that there has been no significant historical variation in 
destinations of export by the Indian software industry. Attempting to change this reliance on the 
US, the government encourages software export to European countries such as the Netherlands 
and Italy. For instance, they offer a refund of 15% of travel expenses for marketing trips to 
European countries, in a bid to veer smaller players in the industry away from the US. 80% of 
Indian software exports are to the six OECD countries that account for 71% of the worldwide 
software market: USA, UK, Japan, France, Germany and Italy (NASSCOM). 
In addition to the US being the largest software market in the world, American firms moved 
far quicker than the Europeans in taking advantage of offshore programming (Heeks, 1998). In 
addition, the US has had more liberal rules of employment and immigration historically11. India is 
“more locked-in to the US market than others because many Indian businesses have links through 
family members or friends who are US residents” (Heeks, 1998). This is a self-perpetuating cycle. 
Even as the share of the US market for software is diminishing as trade becomes increasingly 
global and as worldwide, economy shifts towards an emphasis on knowledge as opposed to 
capital, the US market is still growing in absolute terms. While new markets (particularly in Europe) 
are being actively explored, the trend of a US-oriented market for Indian software export is 
expected to continue for the next 4-5 years (NASSCOM). 
 
4.2.4 LOW IN COST AND HIGH IN QUALITY 
India has become a popular outsourcing destination for many major players in the global 
software market. What is more remarkable than a growth that hovers around 50% is the fact that 
this growth is sustained year after year. Some of the reasons that have been offered for the 
                                                
11
 An H1B visa allows a foreigner with technical skills and a job offer from a U.S.-based company to 
work in the United States for three to six years. Sunil Mehta of NASSCOM indicates that 
approximately 40% of H1B visas issued by the United States are to Indians (Excerpt from interview 
on http://www.namasthenri.com/snippets/150203b.htm, last accessed 6th December 2005). 
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remarkable sustenance of this high growth (Heeks, 1996; Arora et al., 1999; Fernandes, 2001; 
Interviews) are that labor is available at low cost in India while a high quality of work is maintained. 
Figure 4 shows a comparison between countries in terms of cost and quality of labor.  
 
Figure 4: Cost and Quality comparison 
 
Source: McKinsey (2001) 
 
There is a huge pool of English-speaking technically skilled workers and a major 
advantage, especially to the BPO industry, is a 12-hour time difference with the US. Figure 5 
shows the cost savings due to off-shoring development work, and Figure 6 highlights the 
competitiveness of the industry as identified in the NASSCOM-McKinsey report of 2002, which 
studied the Indian software industry and identified strategic initiatives to ensure its sustained 
growth. It found that companies value the flexible nature of Indian professionals and the ability of 
the Indian company to assemble functional teams of engineers at very short notice. The parallel 




Figure 5: Cost difference breakdown 
 
Source: McKinsey (2001)  
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4.2.5. PEOPLE ARE ‘EXPORTED’ IN ADDITION TO SERVICES 
There are three approaches that Indian companies take in exporting software. The first is 
pure onsite work, or labor augmentation, where the company supplies the foreign client with the 
requisite skilled labor. The client is responsible for work allocation and project management in this 
case. A second approach is to combine onsite and offshore work in varying proportions. Offshore 
work is far more cost effective: as much as 25-30% below the cost of the same job undertaken 
onsite (Arora et al., 1999). Two of the main restraints to conducting work offshore are trust in the 
capabilities of the company that the task is being outsourced to, and the issue of face-to-face 
communication being necessary (Arora et al., 1999). Typically the Indian company sends a team of 
software engineers to understand the client’s requirements and development is carried out 
offshore, in India. Sometimes members of the team may reside in the client’s location in order to 
facilitate specifications confirmation and to reassure the client that the project is going on course 
and that requirements are clearly understood. This is more important than may seem evident, as 
one of the common complaints about Indian software companies by foreign clients is that they feel 
the existence of a fence between them: the clients are used to an interactive exchange of 
viewpoints on requirements analysis and problem complexities, whereas Indians are said to be 
silent through much of the process, to the discomfort of the clients who are unsure if their 
communication is effective (Interviews12).  
Indian software exporters used to start by venturing into low-skilled onsite programming. 
This has been labeled with the derogatory term “body-shopping”, and such companies were said to 
be “glorified employment agencies” (Interviews). The past 10 years has seen the emergence of 
“on-line labor” (Aneesh, 2000) as programming has steadily shifted offshore. The shortage of 
analysts and the expense associated with traditional onsite work has led to a migration of 
experienced analysts to the foreign country, and the offshore outsourcing of work to local 
                                                
12
 One interviewee likened this to throwing a package over a high wall, unsure of whether the 
person on the other side has caught it; in fact unsure if there is indeed another person on that side 
of the wall! 
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companies. In 1988, the ratio of onsite to offshore work was in the region of 65:35. Software is 
particularly conducive to being produced remotely from the customer and this led to a proliferation 
of outsourcing activities from the late 1980’s (Heeks, 1996). Heeks (1998) reports that 75% of the 
work was done onsite and just under 25% of the work done offshore in the late 1980’s. A report by 
the Software Technology Park, Kanpur13 mentions that onsite work comprised 58% of export 
revenues during 1999-2000. In 2000-01, 51% of Infosys’ revenues and 53% of Wipro’s were from 
onsite work. In 2003-04, 41% of India’s software export revenues came from onsite delivery 
models (NASSCOM).  
A third approach is to completely shift work offshore, often to an Offshore Development 
Center (ODC) that is exclusively dedicated to one customer. This is becoming increasingly popular 
with the US and European firms who wish to take advantage of the lower costs of skilled labor in 
India, and have sufficient confidence in the company’s ability to manage the project and deliver the 
software (Arora et al., 1999). Despite an average 12-hour time difference with India, a high-speed 
datacom link can provide a client in the US with a virtual 24-hour office environment, which almost 
cuts the development life cycle in half, thus ensuring speedy deliveries with high quality.14 At the 
same time, the foreign client does not have to own the company in India, which is a completely 
different proposition with its own exposure to risks, change in asset base, managing headcount, 
accounting principles, and corporate governance. This is seen as a capital efficient way to rapidly 
ramp-up the company’s product development effort. 
An ODC typically involves a long term contract with an agreement on unitary pricing, and 
when projects are assigned by the client, negotiation is generally restricted to the resources that 
the project will consume—typical of the Time and Materials (T&M) nature of the software industry 
in India. Some companies such as HCL Technologies, with 29 ODCs, thus derive over 70% of their 
revenues from offshore work15. Some of the issues in choosing between onsite and offshore 
                                                
13
 http://www.STPIk.net.in/background.html  
14
 Source: Businessweek, Jan 2000 issue 
15
 India Today, http://www.india-today.com/btoday/20010521/feature3.html  
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strategies of development (Interviews) include trust, project size and importance to client’s 
functioning, the need for interaction, the skill profile of the local company, and managerial 
perceptions: Indian engineers prefer joining companies that offer them a chance to go abroad and 
thus managers, in a bid to hire good employees and subsequently retain them, often opt for some 
amount of onsite work. 
 
4.2.6. SPREAD ACROSS THE “VALUE PYRAMID” 
In the past, clients usually hired Indian software personnel as programmers rather than 
system engineers or designers (Chakraborty and Dutta, 2002), although the situation has changed 
in recent years. Typically the initial stages of strategy, architecture design, requirement analysis, 
specification and system design are characterized by higher skill and greater value added, and the 
later stages of coding, testing and maintenance are characterized by lower skills and lesser value 
added. As the Indian software companies have gained in experience and capability, they have 
gradually moved up the software waterfall, shown in Figure 7. 
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Source: Adapted from Somerville (1992) 
 
The Value Pyramid (Figure 8) is a contribution of this study; it illustrates the four different 
steps at which Indian software (service) companies position themselves. The pyramid is bottom-
heavy, indicating that the number of Indian companies participating at a particular step increases 
as we move downwards. The trend in the industry is that existing companies move upward in this 
“Value Pyramid”, while new companies continue to enter at different steps. At the first step of the 
value pyramid, the company’s value proposition centers on the features and benefits that it offers 
Requirements Analysis
High Level Design 









its clients in terms of labor services. The customer is in a sense responsible for realizing the 
benefits, by requesting for the right skills or allotting the right modules. Project management is left 
to the client typically. Companies that position themselves here offer services in onsite and 
offshore development. The billing structure is typically T&M (time and materials) or cost-plus. 
Skilled labor and effective cost management is the keystone of this step. 
 















As the company moves to the second step, it takes over project management and functions 
on a fixed cost, project-oriented billing structure. There is greater responsibility to deliver the 
project and to understand the best practices for the client, to effectively integrate the system into 
the client’s profile. Requirement analysis and specification is the keystone of this step.  
Time and Materials based, project management handled by client 
Fixed fee paid to manage and deliver project 
Company has in-depth understanding of client’s business processes 
Company is strategic business partner. 
  
 Value 
Size of base is an indication of the 
number of companies in that ‘Step’
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Moving to the third step requires a greater leap than moving to the second. It requires a 
deep understanding of the client’s business processes, and technology must be cohesive with the 
business processes of the client. This step is characterized by a fine-tuned requirement analysis 
arising from the client’s business requirements rather than project definition. The company is now 
responsible not just for an accurate understanding of the client’s specifications and an exact and 
correct implementation of the technology, but also for the benefits accrued by the client via the 
technology nominated by the company. The third step allows a much higher proportion of value to 
be captured, because the benefits that customers realize can be quantified more easily, and 
because few competitors are able or willing to supply at the third rung (Interviews). 
At the fourth and highest step, the company must align itself as a strategic partner with the 
client, and work to provide business solutions to the client rather than technological solutions. The 
company in a sense must share responsibility for its client’s success. The keystone of the fourth 
step is the ability to cohesively integrate the client’s strategy with the company’s value proposition. 
Technology is no longer central to the value proposition, but is seen by the company (and not just 
by the client) as a tool in attaining its strategic vision (Interviews). 
The inter-step ovals denote the fact that companies often straddle different steps of the 
value pyramid. It is difficult to climb up this pyramid, as it requires a repositioning of the company in 
terms of competencies, skills, business understanding, and reputation. Companies may exist within 
the same step with different revenues, and may even increase revenues and profits dramatically 
while staying at the same step. This is because the steps in the value pyramid are not related to 
revenues and profits in any way, but rather with business objectives and value propositions. 
Companies that function in the inter-step ovals use the lower step as a supporting platform (or 
cash-cow) for their activities in the higher step.  
In the early years, Indian firms typically functioned in the lower steps of the value pyramid. 
This has changed in recent years, with companies spreading across the pyramid (Interviews). 
Work in the first step is characterized by a “Time and Materials” basis of billing, rather than a Fixed 
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Price basis, rather like a construction company. This follows logically from the way software export 
companies in India begin operations: through “professional service projects” or “staff augmentation 
services” or “body-shopping” for overseas clients. As trust builds, the client may allow larger 
fractions of the work to be carried out offshore, on a time and materials (or cost-plus) basis of 
billing. If the client is a major source of the company’s revenue, it may become an Offshore 
Development Center (ODC), handling projects exclusively for that client on a long-term 
arrangement. Negotiations for each project are then limited to the resources required in order to 
ascertain the time and materials required (Arora et al., 1999). One of the conventional paths for 
export service firms to upgrade is to become the “product developer” for their customer, albeit one 
that does not hold the intellectual property (Tschang, 2003) or benefit from the revenue potential of 
the product. 
Between 1988-1998, at least 65% of export contracts were solely for programming work 
(Time and Materials billing) and the other 35% had a prominent fraction of programming work too 
(Heeks, 1998). In 1996, 85% of workers in Indian software exports were programmers (Heeks, 
1996). There is a dire shortage of system analysts with 5-6 years experience. As programmers 
gain knowledge of system design by working on either domestic or export projects, they are 
attracted by job opportunities in foreign countries (typically the US) thus migrating (popularly 
labeled as ‘brain drain’). The reverse brain-drain phenomenon (discussed in Chapter 5) is more 
recent and refers to people, with both capital and years of experience in a product-environment, 
returning to India, resulting in a corresponding boost to the industry.  
 
 
4.2.7. CHARACTERIZED BY CLUSTERS 
Porter indicated that clusters of excellence characterize successful industries, and this is true of the 
software industry in India too. Some factors behind cluster formation are labor availability, quality of 
life, infrastructure, and proximity to previous employer and residence (Haug, 1991). Mumbai started 
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as the main center for companies involved in software development though today most of its export 
volume is from TCS, which reports its group revenue through Mumbai. Firms are clustered in a few 
cities, notably: Bangalore (in Karnataka state), Hyderabad (in Andhra Pradesh state) and Chennai 
(in Tamil Nadu state). Table 9 shows clusters by export revenue and Table 10 shows clustering by 
number of software companies. 
 
 















Table 10: Clustering of Software Companies in India by number 
 
Cluster Number of STP 
companies, 1999
Number of STP 
companies, 2004 
Bangalore 267 1322 
Hyderabad 138 800 
Chennai 67 866 
Mumbai 28 250 








Cluster 1999-2000 2000-2001 2003-2004 
Bangalore 1057.5 1635.7 4022.5 
Chennai 413.8 646.8 1693.5 
Hyderabad 229.9 435.4 1116.7 
Total exports of these 3 
cities as a % of national 
software exports 
43% 44% 55% 
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While only a fraction of Indian software companies are NASSCOM members, as the main forum for 
the industry the distribution of its member companies is shown in Table 11 and Table 12. 
 
Table 11: Clustering of the 892 NASSCOM member-companies, 2004 
 









Table 12: Clustering of NASSCOM member-companies, pre-2004 
 
City Number of NASSCOM-registered companies  
 2000 2002 2003 
 
Bangalore 122 160 182 
Chennai 55 72 92 
Hyderabad 64 61 78 
Mumbai 131 148 152 
Delhi (incl. Noida 
& Gurgaon) 
111 106 182 
Kolkata 25 32 32 
Pune 23 48 57 
Other 69 73 79 




From this data, it can be seen that clusters characterize the software industry in India. This is in 
accordance with the general principle of Cluster Theory, which expresses that successful industries 
tend to appear in clusters. 
 
In providing a background of the industry, an organization that merits mention is NASSCOM 
(National Association of Software and Service Companies), the premier trade-body and the 
chamber of commerce of the IT software and services industry in India. Started in 1998 with 38 
members, today NASSCOM has over 900 members (see Figure 9) in the business of software 
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development, software services, and IT-enabled/BPO services. A not-for-profit organization, 
NASSCOM has been the strongest proponent of global free trade in software in India, and its 
members account for over 95% of the revenues of the software industry in India (NASSCOM). 
 
Figure 9: Growth in NASSCOM Membership: 1998 to 2004 
 
 
Source: Data from NASSCOM (www.nasscom.org) 
 
 
This chapter has described and analyzed the case that is being studied in this thesis. Both 
a country-level background and an industry-level background are provided. India as a country has 
not demonstrated a history of market efficiency. The software industry in India is service-centric 
and export focused and is known to provide high quality at a low cost. Companies in the industry 
participate in a people plus services export model, are largely focused on the lower steps of the 
value pyramid, and cluster together. The next chapter discusses the findings of this study, with 




































Chapter 5: Findings  
Clusters tend to prove the adage that “nothing succeeds like success”. Once a cluster has 
reached a certain critical threshold, the natural dynamics tend to take over. At that point, the 
reasons for the success of the cluster are clear: all the factors required to succeed are available in 
abundance. The cluster’s success reinforces itself. The key point that is of interest then, is how the 
cluster reaches that critical threshold. This study finds that, for the Indian software industry, the 
Government of India was the primary driver behind cluster formation by providing infrastructure and 
outlining supportive fiscal and human resource policies. Figure 10 illustrates how Government 
policy resulted in the creation of three Critical Success Factors, and the rest of the chapter 
expands on these. 
Figure 10 is an adaptation and enhancement of Figure 1. The original flow has been 
retained: that of markets, institutions and policies that drive the determinants, which in turn drive 
the proximate sources responsible for industry success. Examples of each driver are provided, 
within the context of the Indian software industry. In adapting the model in Figure 1 to the Indian 
context, the factors for the success of the industry become clearer, as well as their logical 
sequence. In the final addition to the left (block arrow feeding back into Proximate Sources), Figure 
10 shows how the industry exhibits clusters of excellence, and how the clusters themselves further 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.1 Policy Support: Policies between 1956 and 2004 
5.1.1 1956 TO 1974: CREATING THE INDUSTRY 
 
While the early history of the use of software and software development in India predates 
this period, its usage was intimately linked with hardware and the growth of that industry (Heeks, 
1996). The first computer was introduced in India in 1956 for use at the Indian Statistical Institute 
(ISI) a government organization16 (Patibandla et al., 2000). The ISI was based in Bangalore. The 
ISI rented out computational time to organizations that required it, because the computer was 
under-utilized. Large organizations in its vicinity, such as Dunlop, rented time for their payroll 
computations. For this, they required systems programmers. By introducing a computer through a 
public organization, the Government in effect created the seed of the first cluster, in Bangalore, 
giving rise to a natural demand for computational resources and for software programmers who 
could execute these tasks. This period saw the beginning of software development companies, 
notably Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) in 1968—TCS still is the largest exporter of software in 
India. 
Until the mid-1960s, multinational hardware companies like IBM and ICL imported software 
and hardware. Through the 1960’s, the Government pressured the wholly-owned multinational 
subsidiaries to dilute their equity, but the MNC market domination gave them the bargaining 
strength to resist (Heeks, 1996). The Government then started a public sector enterprise called the 
Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (ECIL), in order to indigenize production (Heeks, 1996). This 
was an embodiment of “the thrust of the policy direction… on self-reliance through import 
substitution” (Heeks, 1996). ECIL designed and built a successful version of the PDP-8 of DEC, 
                                                
16
 One interviewee related that the ISI ‘rented’ out computational time to organizations that required 
it, because the computer was under-utilized. Large organizations rented time for payroll 
computations. This gave rise to a natural demand for computational resources and for software 
programmers who could execute these tasks. 
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called TDC-12 (Trombay Digital Computer- 12) but concluded that while design and building of 
computers was possible in India, it was commercially unviable (Rajaraman, 2000). 
Recognizing the demand for computational resources and the potential market for software 
export, while committed to a socialistic “control’ culture, the Government then came up with the 
“Software Export Scheme” in 1972. Under this scheme, a company could import as much 
computational resources as it liked, but in exchange it had to export a certain minimum amount of 
software (which varied from 100-150% of the cost of the hardware) over a period of four years, plus 
1.5 times the cost of the wage bill annually. This gave rise to software development companies as 
an organic outcome! In 1974, TCS became the first firm to agree to export software in return for 
permission to import hardware, developing a stores and inventory control software solution for an 
electricity generation unit in Iran (Heeks, 1996). The same year, it developed a hospital information 
system in UK along with Burroughs Corporation, at that time the second-largest hardware company 
in the world17. Awareness of the industry’s potential grew with these projects, which were major 
landmarks in the industry (Patibandla et al., 2000). 
 
5.1.2 1975 TO 1984: ENCOURAGING LOCAL COMPANIES 
The Government’s thrust towards self-reliance gathered momentum in this period. Through 
the late 1970’s, there was increasing pressure on multinational users and vendors to upgrade their 
technology, pay for all imports with equivalent exports and, above all, to dilute their equity or find 
an Indian company as a local collaborator for manufacturing their machines. While ICL agreed to 
dilute its equity down to 40%, IBM refused and threatened to ‘quit India’. Since they had a majority 
market share, their presence was necessary for the support and maintenance of most of the 
computer installations in India. This posed a dilemma to the Government. Witnessing the creation 
of a number of companies like TCS in 1968 and later Hindustan Computers Limited (HCL) in 1976 
(Evans, 1997), the Government of India created the Computer Maintenance Corporation (CMC), in 
                                                
17
 Dataquest India December 23, 2002 
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an effort to indigenize maintenance. CMC was given a monopoly of servicing all foreign-installed 
systems in India, 800 of which were IBM machines18. The Government then pressed its case with 
IBM who finally decided to leave India in 1978, rather than fall in line (Heeks, 1996).  
This was a critical turning point for the industry: the departure of IBM underscored the 
Government’s belief in the capability of the industry to stand on its own two feet; it created an 
Indian company that had from its start a large customer base and a team of capable individuals; 
and most importantly, it contributed to the growth of the home market (Patibandla et al., 2000)—
some of IBM’s 1,200 former employees set up computer bureaux that later migrated towards 
software development (Heeks, 1996; Rajaraman, 2000; Interviews). Local hardware manufacturers 
drifted into software development or themselves turned into software development centers (Evans, 
1995).  
The Government didn’t stop there: it made the smart move of further eroding vendor 
control, by instituting a policy that required the buyer (or CMC) to maintain imported machines 
(primarily mainframes). This meant that companies that wanted computational power had to 
effectively create an in-house maintenance team. This made buying a computer even more 
expensive. Companies began to set up departments that would sell services or computer time to 
other firms (Heeks, 1996). Since these computers were typically imported, another method to ease 
the import process was for the firm to undertake software exports. Smaller enterprises formed by 
groups of professionals who were once with IBM or with some of the earlier players such as PCS, 
also started during this period. Softek at Delhi (systems software) and Infosys at Pune and later in 
Bangalore (applications and embedded software) are notable examples. These clusters started 
close to the areas where these professionals lived. Despite the tough policy environment, by 1981-
82, India was the only developing nation to have any significant software exports—$12 million—a 
substantial leap over the 1979 level of $4.4 million. 
 
                                                
18
 Computer Maintenance Corporation (CMC) website: http://www.cmcltd.com/PROFILE/Profile.htm  
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5.1.3 1985 TO 1994: CREATING A POSITIVE IMAGE WITHIN AND OUTSIDE 
INDIA 
The period between 1975 and 1984 was characterized by ‘Coalition Governments’, which 
never lasted long and led to discontinuity in political thought. The only perception that was 
pervasive through this period was that information technology would cause unemployment and was 
thus an evil to be tolerated as long as it did not reach beyond its rigid confines in the export 
enclaves. The Government had an impression of software as a necessary evil because some 
amount of high-end computing was required but at the same time it threatened to take over the 
low-end jobs as well thus increasing unemployment. The unstable coalition governments did not 
want to turn the vote bank against them and were particularly careful while implementing policies 
that were seen to be ‘supportive’ of the software industry. In order to progress, the Government 
had to find a way to convince the general population of the social benefits of computerization. 
The Prime Minister during this decade was Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, who was IT-literate and was 
to be an important promoter of IT in India. In 1986, the Indian railways started computerization of 
their passenger reservation system. CMC carried out a highly successful implementation. Since the 
railways were so much a part of the ordinary citizen’s life, the railway computerization project 
played a major role in communicating the positive effects of technology, as well as in proving and 
further developing the capabilities of Indian software engineers to carry out projects on such a vast 
scale (Rajaraman, 2000). This was another turning point in the industry. The Government could 
now feel safe that promoting the industry would not turn voters against them19. They started seeing 
it as a valuable source of foreign exchange, and policy began to shift towards subtly encouraging 
it. In 1985, Texas Instruments (TI) set up its Indian operations, TI India (Private) Limited, a 100 
percent export-oriented subsidiary (its first outside the United States), and began the work of CAD 
                                                
19
 Though as the 2004 elections proved, this is thin ice. The IT-savvy ministers of Karnataka 
(Bangalore) and Andhra Pradesh (Hyderabad) were not voted back to their positions. Apparently, 
the voters do not believe that software will feed their children. 
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Design in Bangalore in 198620. In that year, the Ministry of Information Technology (MIT) introduced 
a policy document on "Computer Software Export, Software Development and Training" (Saxenian, 
2002). The STPI scheme was first mooted in 1990 as a tool to integrate India with the world 
markets by providing infrastructure for software companies that could not afford to build these 
themselves. The STPIs came into being in 199121, and proved to be critical in the growth of the 
industry—their role will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.  
In December 1986, the Government of India announced their first policy for software export 
(Oberoi and Ragunathan, 1991), and the thrust of policy making has been inclined towards that 
segment ever since. While importing hardware and software became easier and restrictions on the 
domestic use of imported hardware were dropped, software export obligations (produced from 
imported hardware) were strengthened (Heeks, 1996). In 1989, duty on software import was raised 
from 60% to 107% (Heeks, 1995). This was an absolutely brilliant move. Rather than subsidising 
the industry, the Government made it more difficult to get access to critical computational power. 
The Government effectively forced private companies to develop software expertise or to give work 
to local software companies, reinforcing the basic factors behind the creation of a cluster. It is 
difficult to conceive of a strategy that could be as effective in kick-starting an industry. 
In June 1990, there was a strategic alliance established between the software industry and 
the Department of Electronics (DoE). The National Association of Software Companies 
(NASSCOM) was created, as the voice of the industry. The strategic alliance between DoE and 
NASSCOM was critical for success because the DoE and Government could focus on what was 
needed and improve the felt needs of the industry (Interview). In a letter to us, N. Vittal (Secretary, 
DoE) reported that “at a meeting of the Committee held in August 1990, it was decided that if the 
software exports could go up from US$ 100 million in 1990 to US$ 400 million by February 1991, 
the demands of the industry will be considered by the Government. I gave the assurance to the 
Committee in that meeting. On 2nd September, 1990, in the NASSCOM meeting when I announced 






about this decision there was a gasp of disbelief! The target was considered to be too ambitious!” 
Although this target was only reached in 1994, the Government recognized the industry to have 
reached a stage at which benefits rather than taxes should be applied, and significantly revised 
policy, taking a more aggressive approach to promoting the industry. 
The year 1991 saw the start of substantial policy liberalization (Heeks, 1995). For example, 
duty for software import was reduced to 110% in 1992, 85% in 1993 and then split in 1994 to 20% 
for applications software and 65% for systems software. Indian companies could enter into 
agreements with overseas partners to import software, duplicate and sell them in India. The 
Copyright Act was amended and strengthened, the process for export incentive payments and 
creation of export-only units was streamlined (Heeks, 1995). The DoE began to take a more 
promotional role rather than its traditional regulatory role: creating subsidies for companies 
conducting R&D activity, a number of hi-tech programmes were started in collaboration with the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): these and other similar initiatives created a 
large pool of R&D-oriented professionals. The significant devaluation of the Indian rupee provided 
the software industry with internationally competitive prices. Free import of telecommunication 
equipment into the export zones, reduction in charges for satellite links, and excise duty 
exemptions, served to reduce dependency on the domestic industry, which contributed to the 
competitiveness of the export sector. It also helped boost the domestic industry by raising 
competitiveness on the home front. The STPIs became a one-stop single-window clearance 
mechanism and export-oriented processes were streamlined in order to encourage companies to 
export software. Multinational companies viewed this liberalization positively and began to venture 
into India “once their old image of IBM-hating, socialist India had been dispelled” (Heeks, 1996). In 
fact, even IBM re-entered India, this time with an Indian partner! The Government had succeeded 




5.1.4 1995 TO 2004: ACCELERATING INDUSTRY GROWTH 
Post-1995 there was intense activity and excitement in India revolving around Information 
Technology, in parallel with the excitement around the world. The contribution of the software 
industry expanded from 0.5% of the GDP in the fiscal year 1991 to 1.5% of the GDP in the fiscal 
year 1995 (Iwami, 2000) to almost 2.7% in 2000-2001 and 3.82% in 2004 (NASSCOM), as Figure 
11 and Figure 12 indicate. The data in Figure 12 and Table 2 are from different sources and differ 
slightly (e.g. US$12.2m vs. US$12.5m for the year 2003-04). This may be due to different rules for 
rounding, or differing exchange rates used. 
In 1998 the Government created a task force within the Prime Minister’s administration for 
information technology/software development; and in 1999 the Government created the Ministry of 
Information Technology. The State Governments acquired corporate roles and embarked on 
ambitious projects to woo foreign investment within the state. Delegations (typically a mix of 
industry and government personae) were sent to other countries to entice foreign investment, and 
the Government instituted a policy that subsidized travel expenditure by 15% if to a country other 






















The role of the Chief Minister has changed from political leader to CEO of the State. Indian 
cities have finally become the ‘national champions’ that Jessop (1998) talks about, competing with 
each other for investment and infrastructural facilities. While Karnataka was the first state in India 
to announce a special ICT policy in 1997 in order to overcome the city’s infrastructural constraints 
(Fromhold-Eisebith, 2001), other states such as Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have also since 
taken up an aggressive stance in attracting ICT investments, especially FDI (Foreign Direct 
Investment). 
Constraints have been identified and steps taken to overcome them.  The Government of 
India set up a National Task Force on Information Technology to examine the feasibility of 
strengthening the industry, and regular policies are being implemented22. Thus for example, 
venture capital has been the traditional source of finance for the software industry worldwide, yet 
there is a critical shortage of venture capital in India.  In order to remedy this problem, the norms 
for the operations of venture capital funds have been liberalized.  The Government of India is also 
actively providing fiscal incentives and liberalizing norms for FDI and raising capital abroad. An IT 
committee was set up by the Ministry of Information Technology, comprising Non Resident Indian 
(NRI) professionals from the United States to seek expertise and advice and also to step up U.S. 
investments in India's IT sector23.  The Government enacted an Information Technology (IT) Act in 
2000 to accelerate induction of IT in critical sectors of the Indian economy, and to provide a legal 
framework for e-commerce and prevention of computer crimes (Chakraborty and Dutta, 2002). 
The software-driven IT industry has risen over the years, to the top of India's national agenda 
as an instrument and a model for the modernization of India's economy. Starting from the very first 
computer introduced in India in 1956, until today, the Government has consistently implemented 
appropriate policies at the appropriate time.  
                                                
22
 National Taskforce on Information Technology, 1998. 
23
 From www.indianembassy.org  
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5.2 Infrastructure Support: Software Technology Parks 
One of the major contributions of the Government towards the growth of the software export 
industry was the development of the Software Technology Parks. The Software Technology Park 
of India (STPI, an autonomous society under the Ministry of Information Technology) scheme is a 
100% export-oriented scheme for development and export of software, using dedicated data and 
communication channels, or occasionally in the form of physical export. The Software Technology 
Parks (STP) are, in effect, Government created clusters. STP complexes aim to provide (a) 
Physical space (b) Computing power and (c) Bandwidth.  
With the STPI policy being implemented in 199024, there were seven such parks in India in 
1991, with a total of just over 110 companies affiliated with them, as well as eleven such parks 
established by individual companies. The Department of Electronics (DoE) had set up a number of 
Software Technology Parks in select parts of India (18 as of 2004), to meet the following 
objectives: 
1. To establish and manage physical and computing infrastructure for software exporters 
2. Assist with the numerous approvals and certifications required for software exporters 
3. Assist software development organizations with market analysis, and marketing support 
4. To train software professionals 
STPs were spectacularly successful because software was not a physical product and so the 
customs officials could not create too many problems (Kahaner, 1996). Furthermore, the DoE as a 
technical department was able to effectively provide “single window” services to the software 
exporters shielding them from the normal harassment of bureaucracy to which traditional exporters 
were subjected.  78 per cent of the country's total software exports is routed through STPI centres. 
As far as Bangalore is concerned, 95% of exports are routed through the SPTI centre here25. Table 
13 below shows the share of exports routed through STPI centres. The “Total exports from India” 
                                                
24
 STPI website: www.stpi.in  
25
 http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/jun16/isoft.htm last accessed November 15, 2005. 
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values in Table 13 differ slightly from the values in Table 2, possibly owing to different rules for 
rounding, or different exchange rates applied. 
 
Table 13: Trends in IT export from units registered with STPs 
 
Year No. of units 
registered with STPs 
Total exports from 
India ($ million) 
Share of STP units 
in total exports 
1991-92 164 164 na 
1992-93 227 225 8 
1993-94 269 330 12 
1994-95 364 485 16 
1995-96 521 734 29 
1996-97 667 1085 46 
1997-98 844 1750 54 
1998-99 1196 2650 58 
1999-00 5582 3900 68 
 




5.2.1 INFRASTRUCTURE: INFORMATION AND PHYSICAL 
A reliable and dependable communication system is essential for undertaking offshore 
development of software. STPI had established High Speed Data Connectivity (HSDC) facilities 
providing global connectivity at Bangalore, Hyderabad, Thiruvanthapuram, Gandhinagar, 
Bhubaneshwar, Noida, Mohali, Jaipur, Navi Mumbai, Pune, Chennai, Mysore, Manipal, 
Coimbatore, Vizag and Guwahati. These facilities include F3/E3/H4 IBS earth stations that serve 
as the International Gateways. The gateways are integrated with terrestrial wireless systems for 
local loop, or with terrestrial cable systems. The units operating inside the complex have access to 
these facilities through the Local Area Network, while those outside the complex, are extended 
these services to the cluster in the vicinity through a local loop.  
At the time of origin, the DoE made a significant contribution by championing the provision 
of 64 kilobits per second connectivity. This was a great boost in the infrastructure for the exports. 
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Although under the rules of business, the Department of Telecommunications was responsible to 
provide the high-speed communication by way of earth stations, it did not agree to provide this 
facility as “it was not a priority” (Interview). The Government of India authorized the DoE to divert 
Rs. 120 million from an ongoing project for building the Semiconductor Complex at Mohali near 
Chandigarh, towards funding the earth stations. The STPs at Bangalore, Hyderbad, Gandhinagar, 
Thiruvanthapuram, Bhubaneshwar and Noida near Delhi came up with the earth stations in 1991-
1992. Timesharing and time based charges for the use of earth stations was introduced as well. 
For example, instead of Rs. 4 million per annum paid by TI, the Software Companies could 
manage with Rs. 0.2 to 0.3 million depending on their volume of business. These proved to be 
critical success factors. In 2001, over 1400 dedicated, high-speed (64 kbps, 2Mbps and above) 
data-com links were being used by software exporting companies compared to 10 links in 1991 
(NASSCOM). 
Another important function of the STPI is to provide incubating infrastructure for start-up 
operations and Small and Medium Entrepreneurs (SMEs) to enable them to commercialize their 
operations without any gestation period. This enables the SMEs to avoid capital investment in the 
creation of captive facilities for themselves as well as facilitates the SMEs in setting up operations 
rapidly within a time-bound environment. State-of-the-art complexes have been built in co-
operation with the State Governments, and a total area of 200,000 sq. ft. built-up space is now 




5.2.2 BENEFITS OF STPI SCHEME 
Several concessions were given to companies associated with the STPI, including: 
1. Allowing 100% foreign equity participation. Capital invested, royalty, dividends, etc., can be 
freely repatriated after the payment of any income tax that may be applicable. 
2. Not placing any restrictions on the geographical location of an STP complex. 
3. Duty-free import of infrastructure equipment without incurring any export obligations. The 
STP complex is a customs bonded (import tariff free) area.  
4. A five-year block of tax holiday during the first eight years of operation. 
5. Exemption from domestic levies such as excise duty, and sales tax levied on capital goods 
acquired in India. 
6. Permission to sell up to 25% of software exported, in the Indian market. 
 
In summary, the STPIs were a key factor in building the momentum of the software 
industry, providing a central seed around which a local cluster could develop. STPs are amongst 
the most efficient government organizations (Kahaner, 1996), and a major value proposition was 
that they have enabled software exporters to have a single window clearance for all the approvals 
and clearances—a veritable quagmire to the uninitiated—of the various Departments of 
Commerce, Telecommunications, and the Reserve Bank of India. Evans (1992) quotes a DOE 
official saying `"[The STPI] broke 26 separate rules to accommodate TI's Bangalore subsidiary and 
are willing to break more"'. As a result of this initiative, software became an “easy” business to set 
up (Interview), and this perception contributed greatly to the growth of the industry. 
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5.3 Human Capital support: Policies and Institutions 
Human capital has been considered one of the major reasons for the success of the Indian 
software industry (Arora et al. 2000; Interviews). The software industry is a human capital-intensive 
industry (Fernandes et al., 2001). Investment in human capital, increasing returns to scale, and the 
impact of openness in international trade are all important in explaining the high rates of growth in 
developing countries such as India (Sengupta, 1993). This section discusses the Government’s 
role in building a formidable base of engineers capable of contributing to the knowledge economy. 
Some of the measures undertaken by the Government are in the nature of policies. As such, they 
may be included in the “Policy Support” section of this chapter. I have however chosen to include 
those policies directly relevant to Human Capital support in this section. 
 
5.3.1 SKILLED AND LOW-COST HUMAN CAPITAL 
The wage comparisons (in 1995) of software personnel across 7 countries are shown in Table 14.  
 
Table 14: Comparison of Salaries in 1995 
Position Switzerland USA Canada UK Ireland Greece India 
Project Leader $74,000  $54,000  $39,000  $39,000  $43,000  $24,000  $23,000  
Business 
Analyst $74,000  $38,000  $36,000  $37,000  $36,000  $28,000  $21,000  
Systems 
Analyst $74,000  $48,000  $32,000  $34,000  $36,000  $15,000  $14,000  
Systems 
Designer $67,000  $55,000  $36,000  $34,000  $31,000  $15,000  $11,000  
Dev. 
Programmer $56,000  $41,000  $29,000  $29,000  $21,000  $13,000  $8,000  
Support 
Programmer $56,000  $37,000  $26,000  $25,000  $21,000  $15,000  $8,000  
 
 





While salaries rise by around 5-12% year-on-year (higher rates for less developed 
countries), Table 14 highlights the difference in cost between personnel in India and in other 
countries. It appears from these statistics, as well as from other sources (Interviews; Heeks, 1996; 
Arora et al., 2000; Fernandes et al., 2001) that one of India’s chief advantages was, and continues 
to be, its low cost skilled labor.   
The skill of the labor is evidenced through certain anecdotal examples. One interviewee 
narrated how a team of software engineers in India was approached, among other teams across 
the world, to write a specific code to solve a problem. There was a time constraint of four days. The 
Indian team was able to complete it in eight hours. Another interviewee narrated an incident where 
an Indian company (Infosys) was able to deliver a project in a year and a half, when established 
players such as IBM and Accenture were unable to deliver it to the client’s satisfaction even after 
two years. Fernandes et al. (2001) makes the general summarization of his interviews with US 
managers about the skills of Indian software workers as “Indian vendors were good and willing 
learners, receptive to new ideas, and flexible in terms of the software and hardware platforms for 
which they provide services”.  
 
 
5.3.2 INDIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM CREATES SKILLED WORKFORCE 
Murphy et al. (1991) looked at the growth implications of college enrollment levels in 
engineering. They discovered that there is a large direct and indirect positive effect of engineers on 
growth. While the Indian educational system is rated fifth-best in Asia overall26, India boasts of 
some of the best technical institutions in the world, notably the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) and 
                                                
26
 Times of India online article “India’s education system fifth-best in Asia”, dated 3rd September 
2001. Rating based on “overall impression of quality… availability of high quality production labour, 
the cost and availability of qualified management staff, proficiency in English and overall skill of the 
labour force” 
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the six Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs). Other high-quality technical institutions are the Birla 
Institute of Technology, Pilani (BITS Pilani), Birla Institute of Technology, Ranchi (BIT Ranchi), 
Roorkee Technological University, and the Regional Engineering Colleges (RECs). The 
Government funds all these institutions, either entirely, or in large part.   
According to Mueller (1994), appropriately targeted education is the key to improving the 
quality of labor in developing countries. Evidence suggests that development of human capital is 
highly correlated with growth rates in developing countries. The main strengths of the Science and 
Technology educational system in India is the fact that it offers programs at a low cost to students, 
is fairly well structured, and focuses on analytical skills. This was one of the key policies of the 
Nehruvian Government, post-Independence. The Government, under a Commission chaired by Dr 
Rajaraman, initiated the Master of Computing Applications (MCA) programme with the objective of 
training students with science and business degrees to develop applications software for managing 
enterprises (Rajaraman, 2000). The programme was initially offered at ten institutions and was 
seen to be a significant driver of the software industry in its formative years (Rajaraman, 2000). 
Table 15 shows the distribution of educational institutions in India, in 1996.  
 
 
Table 15: Distribution of Engineering Colleges in India, in 1996 




(number of students) 
Central 50 9470 
East 25 4812 
North (incl North-West) 140 25449 
West 140 34165 
South (incl south-West) 308 82597 
Total 663 156493 
 




Initially, the industry’s sole backward linkage with the universities was a demand for 
technically trained personnel. Today, the quality of education has been affected: while the syllabi 
have become more relevant to the needs of the industry, the enormous demand for software 
courses (due to the growth of the industry as well as the migration of experienced personnel) 
combined with a dearth of capable faculty has led to some dilution of quality27. Training institutions 
have sprung up around the software clusters, to equip candidates with the skills required by 
companies. These institutions develop linkages with industry in order to offer ‘job placement’ as 
one of their selling points. Intelligent English-speaking graduates are trained at these institutes; 
and armed with the requisite skills they join software companies since these are the companies 
that generally offer the most lucrative options.  
 
 
5.3.3 GOVERNMENT CREATED A LARGE POOL OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING 
ENGINEERS 
The number of engineers with postgraduate training in India had increased by almost 45% 
in two years, from 12,000 in 1987-89 to over 17,000 in 1990-92 (Fernandes, 2001).  The growth in 
student enrollment in AICTE (All India Council of Technical Education) approved degree institutions 
in the 1990’s has grown at an average rate of 11.5% per annum, with a growth of 29% from 1996-
1997 and 19% from 1997-1998 (Fernandes, 2001). Table 16 shows the growth in the number of 
educational institutions between 1950 and 2002. From 1950-51 to 2001-02, the number of schools 
increased by 4.4 times, the number of colleges for general education increased by 23.6 times, the 
number of colleges for professional education increased by 11.6 times, and the number of 
universities increased by 10.1 times. 
 
                                                
27
 World Bank, 2000 
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Table 16: Growth in Government-recognized educational institutions  








1950-1951  230683 370 208 27 
1955-1956  310703 466 218 31 
1960-1961  397391 967 852 45 
1965-1966  494476 1536 770 64 
1970-1971  536050 2285 992 82 
1975-1976  603895 3667 3276 101 
1980-1981  664631 3421 3542 110 
1985-1986  729555 4067 1533 126 
1990-1991  792187 4862 886 184 
1991-1992  805246 5058 950 196 
1992-1993  814354 5334 989 207 
1993-1994  822485 5639 1125 213 
1994-1995  850528 6089 1230 219 
1995-1996  866829 6569 1354 226 
1996-1997  887180 6759 1770 228 
1997-1998  912323 7199 2075 229 
1998-1999 929341 7494 2113 237 
1999-2000  956519 7782 2124 244 
2000-2001  971054 7929 2223 254 
2001-2002  1017159 8737 2409 272 
 
Source: Data from Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India 
 
 
Table 17 provides a region-wise listing of approved institutions offering an engineering 
programme, while Table 18 and Table 19 shows the distribution of engineering colleges and 
students in 2002 and 2004. The South (includes Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Chennai: see Figure 
2, Map of India) has a large fraction of the country’s engineering colleges. As of 2004, 52% of the 
total number of engineering colleges in India are in the South (including South-West) and 45.8% of 
the colleges in the country that offer a diploma in engineering; as well as significant fraction of all 
enrolled students: 53.8% of those enrolled in the country’s engineering colleges and 39.1% of 
those enrolled in colleges offering a diploma in engineering. This is interesting given that software 
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professionals are chiefly from South India28; this being reflected in the number of engineering 
institutions suggests the correlation between India’s success in software and its human capital.  
 
Table 17: Clustering of educational institutions in the South, in 1996  
Region % Distribution of 
engineering colleges 
Sanctioned capacity 
(number of students) 
Central 8% 9470 
East 4% 4812 
North (incl North-West) 21% 25449 
West 21% 34165 
South (incl south-West) 46% 82597 
 
Source: Data from Ramarao (1998) 
 
Table 18: Number and distribution of Engineering colleges in 2002 and 2004  
 
Region 2002 2004 
Central 64 112 
East 71 114 
North 87 106 
North-West 99 153 
South 269 496 
South-West 108 207 
West 140 158 
Total 838 1346 
 
Source: Data from AICTE  
 
 
Table 19: Number and distribution of Engineering students in 2002 and 2004 
 
Region 2002 2004 
Central 17750 37195 
East 16917 34016 
North 20036 32298 
North-West 22219 50645 
South 71866 165757 
South-West 37262 70788 
West 41719 48990 
Total 232229 439689 
 
Source: Data from AICTE  
                                                
28
 NASSCOM (2003) annual industry survey: 44% of software professionals in India are from the 
South. See http://www.indiainfoline.com/cyva/feat/itto.html, last accessed on 6th December 2005. 
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In 1997, the total stock of qualified scientific and technological manpower in India was 6.5 
million, with 190,000 new degree holders at the graduate level and 41,800 at the post-graduate 
level added each year (World Bank, 2000). While companies prefer to hire engineering graduates 
(Arora and Asundi, 1999), there is an increasing trend of hiring diploma holders. This has resulted 
in a rise in the number of diploma engineering colleges and students. Table 20 shows the 
distribution of diploma engineering institutes and students in 2004. Figure 13 shows the growth in 
the number of engineering and technology graduates. 
 
Table 20: Distribution of Diploma Engineering institutes and students, 2004 
 





Central 98 19830 
East 97 14099 
North 140 17003 
North-West 150 25400 
South 310 62311 
South-West 251 11294 
West 178 38365 
Total 1224 188300 
 
Source: Data from AICTE 
 
 















Source: Data from World Bank (2000); AICTE 
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5.3.4 PAST INVESTMENTS IN EDUCATING ‘MIGRANTS’ PAID OFF 
Since the 1970’s, many graduates of prestigious institutions such as the Indian Institute of 
Technology left India to pursue opportunities abroad, mainly the US. This “brain-drain” 
phenomenon placed these Government-funded educational institutions under much criticism. After 
all, the Government was spending huge sums of money on educating these students who then left 
the country. Despite protests from various lobbies, the Government persisted in supporting these 
institutions in providing inexpensive, high-quality education. Today, this investment is paying off.  
There is now a trend of Indians who had moved to/settled in America, returning to India for 
personal or professional reasons. They bring back innovative ideas, venture capital, and access to 
markets. The bridge that these Indians have created has been a key factor in publicizing India’s 
capabilities in the global market and in creating the opportunities for Indian companies to flourish. 
Leveraging on their exposure abroad, most of these ‘foreign-returns’ are starting their own firms. 
Take Rama Velpuri (story in Fortune magazine29) for instance. The Indian-born engineer is a U.S. 
citizen with a degree from Louisiana State, and he spent the 1990’s working at Oracle. But when 
he started his own software firm, Oramasters, he decamped for Hyderabad, India. There he runs 
his company for only $30,000 a month (including payroll for his 25 employees) and pays $1,000 a 
month for a five-bedroom house in Hyderabad's upper-class Jubilee Hills (complete with three 
maids, a chauffeur, and a gardener). As engineers and other professionals return home—either 
temporarily or permanently—they transfer not only technology and capital, but also managerial and 






                                                
29
 From Fortune Nov 12, 2002 issue 
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5.3.5 CONTINUOUS EFFORT TO BUILD HUMAN CAPITAL 
A shortage of complementary human capital prevents some countries from achieving higher 
growth rates (Lucas, 1990).  Since software capacity is correlated directly with the size and skill of 
its workforce, there is no more important element of a country’s efforts to increase software 
capacity than the development of its corps of software professionals (Tessler et al., 2003). The 
industry has met the manpower requirements until now, and more institutions are being set up in 
order to meet the requirements in the future. The Government introduced the seven Indian 
Institutes of Information Technology to further promote the presence of quality IT education in 
India. As companies in India begin moving up the value pyramid, it may be expected that the 
number of individuals involved in basic research will increase, both within the private and public 
sectors.  
The trend of business process outsourcing has spread its wings from software development 
and services to a wide range of business operations like call centers and payments processing. 
This is a human resource intensive industry, and even closer to the service model than the 
traditional software export business that has characterized the Indian software industry for the 
better part of half a century. The Government has been actively driving basic computer education 
in schools and colleges, subsidizing educational software. The key point to note about the BPO 
business in India is that it does not require software training, only knowledge of using a computer. 
This makes the pool of available resources vast. IDC (International Data Corporation) has 
predicted that the IT-enabled services market globally will account for revenues of US$ 1.2 trillion 
by 2006. With growth projected at 11 percent annually, the ITES/BPO segment will be one of the 
most significant business opportunities for the Indian software and services industry. Overall this 
sector grew at over 65 percent—upping revenues from US$ 1.6 billion in 2001-02 to touch US$ 2.6 
billion in 2002-03 (NASSCOM). 
 68
While India’s exploits in the software services arena is well known, a less known fact is that 
R&D services in India are now beginning to contribute a large amount to total exports.30 The 
decades of investment in a science-oriented education are thus beginning to pay off. A 2001 Merrill 
Lynch report puts the figure at US$ 0.8 – 1.0 billion for the year 2000-2001 (NASSCOM). Wipro’s 
R&D revenues have increased from US$ 15.97 million in 1995 to US$ 194.95 million in 2000, and 
the division accounted for 52% of Wipro’s revenues in the fourth quarter ended March 31st 200131. 
TCS earns about US$ 103.2 million from its R&D services. HCL had 200 people in R&D services in 
1996. As of 2000, they had 2,200 and the division earns US$ 206.42 million for the company, 76% 
of its total revenues in 2000-200132. Increasingly, companies are looking to move into R&D as a 
substitute for product development, as R&D does not require the capital or marketing ‘guts’ that 
Indian companies are said to lack (Interviews). Intellectual property development is now a major 
objective of the larger firms. Wipro derives over 26% of its revenue from selling intellectual property 
via its services: it develops ‘technology building blocks’ that are integrated into the solutions it 
provides to its clients; but it retains ownership of the blocks themselves33.  The 2001 Merrill Lynch 
study found only one U.S. or European patent from the Indian software industry, and it was issued 
to Wipro (NASSCOM). Yet work at the Texas Instruments facility in Bangalore has generated 25 
U.S. patents for the US parent! 
 
In summary, the Government of India has provided favorable policies, infrastructure, and a 
pool of human capital; each of which has proven vital to seeding and cultivating clusters of 
excellence within the Indian software industry. The next section further illustrates this by discussing 
how Government did not play an active role in developing the Silicon Valley cluster, while 
Government did play an active role in developing the Bangalore cluster.
                                                
30




 2001 Merrill Lynch report 
33
 Businessworld, 27 August, 2001 
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5.4 Discussing Clusters I: Silicon Valley34  
Silicon Valley is home to one-third of the 100 largest technology companies created in the 
United States since 1965. The market value of these firms increased by US$ 25 billion between 
1986 and 1990, and in 1990, exports from the valley formed one-third of the US$ 33 billion total for 
electronic product export of the United States (Saxenian, 1994). Clearly, these revenues are 
drastically different from those of the Indian software industry. The focus of the Valley cluster on 
software products rather than software services is the main reason for this difference. In fact, there 
are many companies in Bangalore that provide software services to the companies in the Silicon 
Valley. As such, companies in the Valley are higher up in the value chain compared to companies 
in Bangalore. 
The Silicon Valley origins are usually traced to the start of Hewlett-Packard Company (HP), 
in a small garage in Palo Alto. Two Stanford students—William Hewlett and David Packard—were 
the founders, inspired by their mentor, believer, and early investor Frederick Terman (sometimes 
referred to as the Father of Silicon Valley). Terman was a professor at Stanford and a primary 
catalyst for the university-industry collaboration that the Valley is famous for. Through channeling 
research grants into local firms, opening graduate programmes to working people in the local 
industry, and arranging field trips for students to the region’s electronic firms, he managed to build 
a tightly-knit relationship between the university and the local industry. One of the key 
developments promoted by Terman was the opening of the Stanford Industrial Park, offering 
tenancy to companies associated with the University. This cluster grew rapidly due largely to 
postwar military spending, and by 1961, the park had 25 companies and 11,000 people in it. These 
companies had strong linkages with Stanford, and were focused on technology innovations.   
Just as Hewlett and Packard played an instrumental role in shaping the philosophy and 
attitude of the Valley (the “HP Way”), a company called Fairchild Semiconductors played a vital 
                                                
34
 This section is a summary of Interviews, books, papers and articles on the topic (see for example 
Saxenian (1994), Kaplan (1999), Kenney (2000), and Rosenberg (2002).) 
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role in being the unsuccessful parent of several very successful spin-off companies, including Intel. 
Of the 30-over semiconductor firms in the Valley in the 1960s, the majority of them were offspring 
of Fairchild. The experience of working at Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation served as a 
powerful bond for many of the region’s early semiconductor engineers, who refer to their early 
training in the “Fairchild University”. However, the habits of close co-operation in the Valley predate 
the semiconductor industry, to the origins of HP—where Hewlett and Packard became very 
involved in the formation and growth of other companies, going out of their way to share what they 
had learned with budding entrepreneurs. Certainly, innovation and information was “in the air”. 
Mobility was the norm rather than an exception, and turnover was high. Employees would get their 
experience at established companies, and then set out on their own, starting small ventures that 
provided them with a sense of independence and accomplishment.  
Stanford University played a key role in the evolution of the Valley. Through the mentoring 
of its staff (such as Terman), the high caliber of its students, its policy of close interaction with 
industry, its funding of start-ups, and its channeling of research funds to local industries, Stanford 
gave the technological stimulus that the cluster needed in the early phases of its growth. It also 
shaped the overall direction of the cluster, making it known for innovation in technology. In the 
1960s-1970s, the University of California at Berkeley too became an important technological 
resource for the industry. By the mid-1970’s, it was granting as many doctoral degrees as Stanford, 
and it had become an important centre of research in semiconductors and computer science. The 
state colleges may have been overlooked, but these were vital as well for the supply of skilled 
manpower to the industry, particularly because they were very sensitive to the needs of the local 
industry through jointly structured programmes and classes conducted on company premises.  
Although the Valley took a beating during the collapse of the semiconductor business, by 
the 1980s it had surpassed Route 128 on the other side of the coast, as the national centre of 
computer systems innovation. By this time, repeat entrepreneurs were common, though the Valley 
had lost the tight-knitted sense of community that is associated with a small group of people. The 
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largest wave of start-ups started in the late 1970’s and accelerated during the 1980’s. Firms 
diversified into many different aspects of technology including flash memory, handheld computer, 
multimedia, virtual reality, ICs and workstations. The spirit of innovation thrived, not just in terms of 
technologies, products, and business models, but also in the corporate structure and the culture 
that the firms embraced. Companies in the Valley preferred local suppliers particularly for 
technologically complex or customized parts. The desire for geographic proximity was not reducible 
by cost considerations due to the difficulty of creating good relationships over distance. This led to 
a thriving cluster as industries both upstream and downstream set up operations in the Valley to 
benefit from the close interactions they could have with their suppliers and customers. Proximity 
enabled firms to come out ahead in the global market due to more efficient networks with their local 
suppliers, and the sense of paranoia that local competitors inspire.  
As the entrepreneurs earned returns, the financing ability of the Valley grew, and venture 
capital replaced military budgets as the chief source of funding. A combination of university 
research, military spending, and entrepreneurial risk-taking thus fueled the growth of the Valley. As 
employees moved from one company to another, they took with them technical expertise that 
drove innovation in product research, design and development so that Silicon Valley could benefit 
from the best innovation produced in the entire cluster rather than  the best innovation produced by 
each company’s proprietary research and development efforts  (Saxenian 2000).  
From this account, it is clear that the university-industry nexus was the primary driver that 
seeded the Silicon Valley cluster, illustrated in Figure 14. As we shall see, this is very different from 
the factors behind the emergence of the cluster in Bangalore. As the skill and knowledge of the 
cluster grew, it became easier to convince industries to relocate there, particularly given the area’s 
























Stanford, Berkeley and the State universities played a significant role in cluster formation, through 
the creation of “generic theoretical knowledge”, papers, and patents. These, along with other 
context motivators such as a growing military budget, contributed to “problem solving knowledge” 
that was useful for specific commercial applications. Firms started by people associated with the 
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5.5 Discussing Clusters II: Bangalore35  
The city of Bangalore, with a population of 6.52 million concentrated in an area of 2190 sq 
km, is one of the fastest growing cities in India. One main reason for this has been the explosive 
growth of the software industry, which has given Bangalore the title of “Silicon Valley of India”. 
More than half of the 778 foreign stand-alone R&D centers established by international 
corporations in India between 1999-2003 were in Bangalore36.  
Bangalore was a charming small town with a number of high-tech industries, a low cost and 
skilled workforce, and a mild climate. The city is situated 3000 feet above sea level, and is well 
known for its comfortable climate, its ample greenery, and lately, its high density of pubs! A recent 
Newsweek article included Bangalore in the list of the world’s funkiest cities, with London, Paris, 
New York, and Beijing. The city offers excellent schooling—both primary and tertiary (see Figure 
15), entertainment facilities including clubs, racetracks and golf courses, and is a rich cultural 
centre as well. Bangalore was known as the “Pensioner’s Paradise” (which attracted senior people 
to set up their companies or subsidaries there). Regarding industry, Bangalore has a long history 
as a centre for textile production in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. During the Second World 
War, several public sector companies (including Hindustan Aeronautics, Bharath Electronics, 
Hindustan Machine Tools, Bharath Earthmovers) were set up under the influence of the 
Government of Mysore, thus creating the other main part of the economy of Bangalore—public 
sector enterprise. Bangalore was chosen for these because of its educational and scientific 
resources, and its strategic location away from the borders of India. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Government of India initiatives in locating public sector 
research and production facilities in Bangalore were dominant. Their direct impact, including 
management of their own townships, housing schemes, and transport systems, was supplemented 
by the numerous subcontracting opportunities they provided for small and medium enterprises. 
                                                
35
 This section is a summary of Interviews, books, papers and articles on the topic (see for example 
Heitzman, 1999; Holstrum, 1998; Saxenian, 2002; Ramarao, 1998). 
36
 India Business Insight, November 2003 
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This was the beginning of an industry cluster. From the late 1960s through the 1970s, there was a 
rapid growth of state government bureaucracy, employment and eventually state-run businesses. 
During the 1980s, Bangalore began to experience the effects of preliminary ‘liberalization’ and 
private enterprises became growth engines, especially in microelectronics-based companies.  
The Indian Telephone Industries (ITI) was established in Bangalore in 1950 in order to 
provide equipment to the Department of Telecommunications (DoT). ITI had a significant impact on 
Bangalore because of the large workforce employed there and the many opportunities it offered to 
subcontracting firms to grow in the Bangalore area. By the 1970s, political interference in this 
public sector company combined with retrograde technological decisions to cripple ITI’s long-term 
competitive posture. The management of ITI took steps to upgrade its technological profile and 
modernize its management techniques. Although ITI was under pressure to develop locally or to 
indigenize modern equipment, it had regularly engaged in arrangements for technology transfer 
with multinational corporations. By the mid-1990s ITI had technical collaborations with 16 foreign 
firms—including ALCATEL, DSC Communications (Denmark), AT&T, and NEC Japan. The skill 
upgrading through technology transfer and the tendency of ITI to sub-contract to companies based 
in the vicinity together created a thriving micro-electronic cluster.  
Under the economic paradigm dominant until the 1980s, the structure of high technology 
innovation rested with a number of government-supported research establishments (the apex in 
Bangalore being the Indian Institute of Science) and with a limited number of large companies, 
such as ITI. In addition to their large internal labor forces, these companies relied on 
subcontracting of specialized components from a number of engineering and production firms, 
which were effectively captive to the market provided by the public sector. Thus Bangalore enjoyed 
a thriving cluster of small and medium enterprises connected by contractual arrangements to the 
public sector.  
The concept of Bangalore as a ‘Silicon Valley’ took off in the mid-1980s under the impact of 
Rajiv Gandhi’s policy of economic liberalization in several high technology fields, including 
 75
electronics. Texas Instruments chose to set up a unit in Bangalore because of the ability of 
technical personnel to communicate in English and to absorb training, a potential labor pool 
emerging from the Indian Institute of Science and other educational institutions, the already 
installed base of electronics industries and subcontractors (through the presence of ITI), the 
attractive climate, and relatively cheap real estate.  
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Source: Data from Ramarao (1998), as cited by Arora et al. (2000) 
 
In a successful case of technology transfer, Texas Instruments set up a 64 Kbps data link 
and later turned it over to the Department of Telecommunications (DoT). This allowed the 
Bangalore team to develop and support software and transmit code online to the US and other 
locations globally. Texas Instruments India began in 1986 with 26 engineers, a total staff of 33, and 
revenues of US$ 0.5 million. By 1994 it employed 230 engineers, a total staff of 270, and 
generated revenues of US$ 6 million. Another example of a ‘pivotal’ company is Infosys. Infosys 
Consultants began in 1981 with an investment of US$ 300 (lent by the wives of the founders) and 
with N R Narayana Murthy as Chairman and Managing Director. The original purpose of the 
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company was to make use of inexpensive but well-trained software engineers in India to provide 
offshore and onsite consultancy on corporate programming projects mostly in the US. The 
company was, in essence, a body-shopping centre that exported labour and expertise, and thus 
was a precursor of the many software houses, both Indian and foreign, that later grew in 
Bangalore. Infosys competed as a vendor offering turnkey contracts for software engineering 
projects; used the difference in time zones between India and the US to allow 24-hour productivity 
in maintenance operations as customer and vendor teams were able to work in relays; and pushed 
the concept of the ‘offshore software development centre’ that functioned as an extension of a 
customer’s software staff. In 1993 the name of the company was changed to Infosys Technologies 
and there was an initial public offer of stock. By 1997, Infosys was getting 87.12 per cent of its 
earnings from exports and 76 per cent of its business from the Americas, and thus stands as one 
of India’s great success stories in offshore software consultancy and innovation. 
Today, there are technology parks that are highly modern locations for multinational 
companies, such as the International Technology Park Limited (ITPL) and Electronics City. The 
Bangalore ITPL was built as a self contained facility with its own captive power supply and satellite 
links. Built to international standards it supports high-tech and non-polluting industries such as 
software development, electronics, communications, research and development (R&D) and 
financial services.  The ITPL represented a successful model of a joint venture in IT between India 
and its foreign partners. The ITPL was a joint venture between the Government of Karnataka, the 
Tata Corporation and a consortium of Singapore companies. Initiated in 1997, the first stage of 
ITPL was completed in 1999 at a cost of US$ 480 million and officially launched in January 2000, 
and stage 2 was launched in November 2000. Encouraging demand for IT facilities has enabled 
ITPL to initiate stage 3 of its expansion, to support the ever-increasing number of software 
companies in Bangalore (almost 1400 by the end of 2004, see Figure 16). The ITPL remains the 
benchmark for IT parks in India with its world-class infrastructure, and it has the highest number of 
occupants compared to other Indian IT parks. The success of these IT parks also depended on the 
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speed of satellite communications. Companies with microwave antennae could be connected by 
satellite uplinks to clients anywhere in the world. Video conferencing is also a norm for Indian IT 
teams to confer and discuss problem solving with their overseas counterparts dispensing the need 
for physical presence. The Electronic City in Bangalore also houses a number of established IT 
multinational companies (MNCs) such as Texas Instruments, Hewlett Packard and IBM. Billion 
dollar Indian companies such as Infosys and Wipro are also located at Electronic City.  
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Source: Data from NASSCOM and STPI 
 
 
Figure 17 is a contribution of this study, showing the different participants in the Bangalore 
cluster. While the transition to a new paradigm was being completed in the 1990s, it was clearly 
underway by the early 1980s. Entrepreneurs emerged from government-supported institutions and 
utilized their contacts there to understand markets, opportunities, and create new businesses. The 
bold lines direct (integral to the business) links in the eco-system, while the dashed lines indicate 
indirect (supporting business) linkages. For instance, Telecom and network software companies 
require legal services although these are not integral to their business. They also require skilled 
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human resources from the private training institutions, engineering colleges, and the universities, 
and these resources are integral to their business. BPO-related work and software service related 
work are the two final outcomes, represented by the boxes “Call Centers and other BPO” and 
“MNC & Foreign Customers”. Government and Infrastructure are shown in a grey oval, separated 
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From this account, the Government’s role in bringing the Bangalore cluster to its critical threshold 
before the natural dynamics of the cluster took over is clear. Unlike Silicon Valley, the Government 
in India played a crucial role in developing the Bangalore cluster, by building human capital through 
educational institutions and public sector enterprises, in addition to nationwide investments in 
infrastructure and supportive policy-making.  
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Chapter 6: Discussion and 
Conclusion 
The last decade has witnessed remarkable changes in the Indian software industry. Several 
Indian software companies are listed on NASDAQ, over 250 Fortune 500 companies have 
outsourced some component of their business process to India, an increasing number of 
multinationals are investing in India (Table 21) and the number of software companies in India is 
steadily increasing. This thesis studied the role of the Government of India in this growth. The 
OECD (2000) model (Figure 1) was adapted and enhanced, as shown in Figure 18, to form a 
framework within which the role of Government could be examined.  
 
Table 21: Key software players investing in India 
 
Company Activity in India 
Hewlett Packard Finance shared service centre in Bangalore; intend to make Bangalore 
their global center. 
ComputerVision 80% of global R&D now done in Pune. 
Novell R&D center in Bangalore 
Oracle OS for Oracle’s Network Computer written in Bangalore office. 
Baan 80% of global R&D now done in Hyderabad. 
Microsoft First R&D center outside of the U.S. is in Hyderbad. 
Boeing R&D centers in India. 
British Aerospace R&D center in Bangalore. 
Adobe R&D center in New Delhi. 
Lucent Technologies R&D centers in Pune and Bangalore. 
British Telecom R&D center in Pune. 
AOL R&D center in India 
SUN Microsystems Invested $50 million in R&D center in Bangalore. 
AT&T Invested $50 million in R&D center in Bangalore. 
CSFB (iNautix) Invested $12 million in an ODC in India. 
 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The study finds that, contrary to popular perception, the Government of India played a 
significant role in the success of this industry by stimulating the creation of clusters of excellence. 
That the impact was greater than was foreseen is a matter of circumstance. Policies were 
intentionally created and actions pre-meditated, and did not accidentally emerge out of “benign 
neglect”, as is popularly believed. This has practical implications for Governments of other 
developing nations who wish to develop their software industries. 
The key limitation of this study is that it is specific to India. As a former British colony, the 
country has the legacy of the English language. It benefits from educational and legal systems 
instituted over the past five decades, a large personal network of world-class computer scientists of 
Indian origin in the US, and from a time difference of 8 to 12 hours from the major outsourcing 
nations. Some of these characteristics are entirely unique to India. Further, many of the policies 
enacted and investments made by the Government were within a very specific socio-economic 
framework that existed once and may not be replicable within the country or outside of it. These 
make generalizations difficult. Governments of other developing nations should examine the role 
played by the Government of India, and analyze the suitability of each policy initiative for their own 
country.   
Specifically, the Government of India invested in education to make available the necessary 
human resources, incubated the industry to ensure its competitiveness in a global market, and set 
up the policy framework and information infrastructure required for the industry to succeed. Policies 
implemented since 1956 led to the creation of a skilled cluster of software companies with a reason 
to export software. The Software Technology Parks of India, an infrastructure and policy effort by 
the Government of India, made it easy to do business: a fundamental criteria for a cluster to 
emerge.  Initiatives by the Government to free up skilled technical labour and 
entrepreneurial/managerial talent, as well as its widespread investment in education over decades, 
provided the human capital essential for these clusters to succeed. Through prudent Government 
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contribution, the impetus was created, until the natural dynamic of the clusters kicked-in, 
accelerating the growth of the industry (see Figure 19). 
 

















Some words must be said to temper this enthusiasm. After all, while Arora et al. (1999) suggest 
that India has 16% of the global market in customized software, this number represents a miniscule 
fraction of the global software market. Unlike the US software industry that is driven by technology 
and product innovation, the Indian software industry measures itself by process maturity (SEI-CMM 
Level 5 is the target of most organizations in India). This creates a business with no true 
competitive advantage, since skilled labour is equally accessible by a U.S. company, as it is by a 
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(redrawn from Figure 17, p78)
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challenge appeared to be an inability to understand the client’s market (directly related to the lack 
of a domestic software market), and therefore a limitation in the ability of the company to become a 
true partner. Companies that demonstrated a strong ability to understand their client’s customer 
are better positioned to progress up the Value Pyramid (Figure 20).  
 
 

















When a relationship approaches the level of business partnership, it often results in an 
acquisition by the foreign client (Interview). It would be useful to study the different strategies 
adopted for moving up the value pyramid, in order that companies in the industry could learn and 
hopefully emulate such successes.  
Time and Materials based, project management handled by client 
Fixed fee paid to manage and deliver project 
Company has in-depth understanding of client’s business processes 
Company is strategic business partner. 
  
 Value 
Size of base is an indication of the 
number of companies in that ‘Step’
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Positioning was also identified as a challenge: the tendency to associate “Indian company” with 
high quality and inexpensive services, but low quality products. Indian companies were said to be 
short of “marketing smarts” and have a mentality of developing software to meet an expressed 
requirement, rather than innovating by identifying an undiscovered need. India has never had a 
strong domestic market for software, and the Government has placed little emphasis on this over 
the years, driven by the foreign exchange earnings of an export-driven strategy. This is one key 
area where the Government can play an active role. Without a strong domestic market, product 
innovation is not possible. Unlike the car industry in Japan (for example), which has achieved 
international excellence largely due to a thriving and competitive domestic market, the Indian 
software industry has had to rely on an export-driven services-based growth rather than a product 
innovation approach. This limits its ability to move upstream, as well as the linkages of the industry 
with the rest of the economy. Unlike Silicon Valley, the software boom in India has not contributed 
much to overall productivity, and the government can do much more in this regard. Certain State 
governments (such as the Andhra Pradesh government) have initiated the use of software within 
the government sector. Measures such as the “IT Kiosks” in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka where 
citizens can pay a variety of service fees (electricity, water, telephone) through a computer, result 
in a contribution to the overall economy in the nature of productivity increases. The domestic 
software sector unfortunately does not have the same glamour as the export sector (which was 
highlighted as part of the last Government’s self-promoting campaign “India Shining”). Short-term 
politicking37 is not supportive of policy implementation designed to support the domestic software 
industry. 
There is little Government investment or private funding of graduate study programmes. 
Fernandes (2001) reports that the number of PhDs awarded in engineering disciplines fell from 
their high of 675 in 1987, to 375 in 1995. Grossman and Helpman (1991) suggest that countries 
                                                
37
 In one conversation with a voter in rural Karnataka, it emerged that each of the two competing 
parties at the village level had given a saree (item of clothing) each to the lady and her daughter, 
and a bottle of arrack (unrefined alcohol) to her husband, in order to buy their votes. She regularly 
accepts these ‘gifts’ and proceeds to vote as she wishes! 
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like India can afford to pay less attention to high level engineering research because their form of 
innovation is the adoption of technologies produced in more developed economies. Consequently, 
there is a 60% vacancy in seats for post-graduate education in engineering (World Bank, 2000) in 
India. Even in the IITs, 60% of the seats for doctoral programmes in engineering are vacant, even 
as 450,000 people vie for just 2,000 seats at the undergraduate level in the IITs. This low 
enrollment in postgraduate programmes leads to a subsequent shortage of high-quality faculty, 
setting up a vicious cycle. Consequently, outside of a few niches, it is unrealistic to expect the 
growth of a product innovation process, or the development of a domestic market that drives a 
level of sophistication in product development that will in turn enable local software producers to 
export their products. In fact, seen in the light of the fact that the Indian Government’s role began 
from the time India gained independence over five decades ago, other Governments may be best 
advised to develop their domestic software industry in order to reap benefits sooner; rather than 
imitate India’s approach to the export market.  
 
 
It will be interesting to explore, in a separate study, the following three questions: 
1. How can India build a national competitive advantage for its software industry (or any emerging 
service industry) so that the country (rather than MNCs) reaps the benefits of its skilled labour? 
2. What is the difference between service-oriented clusters (such as the software industry in 
Bangalore) and product-oriented clusters (such as the software industry in the U.S.)? 
3. And a related question is: how can India’s service-oriented clusters support an endogenous 
model of growth with linkages to the external community?  
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List of Interviewees 
Academics 
 1. Dr. R. Natarajan, Chairman, All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) and formerly 
Director, Indian Institute of Technology, Madras. 
2 Dr. V. Rajaraman, Emeritus Professor of Computer Science, Indian Institute of Science, 
Bangalore; Formerly Chairman of the Technical Manpower Committee; Professor, 
Computer Science, IIT, Kanpur.   
3. Dr. Ashok Rao, Head, Facilitation Unit, Center for Electronics Design and Technology 
(CEDT), Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. 
4 Cdr. Raman, Director, International Institute of Information Technology, Hyderabad. 
5. Dr. Sadagopan, Director, Indian Institute of Information Technology, Bangalore. 
6. Dr. K. V. Dinesha, Professor, Indian Institute of Information Technology, Bangalore. 
 
Government Officials 
1. Mr. K. P. P. Nambiar, Secretary to Government of India, Department of Electronics. 
2. Mr. N. Vittal, IAS; Secretary to Government of India, Department of Electronics. 
3. Mr. Lakshminarayana, General Manager (Rtd) Indian Railways (southern Zone) 




1. Mr. J.A. Chowdary, CEO, PortalPlayer.com & President, Hyderabad Software Exporters 
Association (HYSEA). 
2. Dr. S. Gopalakrishnan, Co-founder and Member of the Board, Infosys Corporation, 
Bangalore. 
3. Mr. N. R. Narayanamurthy, Founder and Chairman and Mentor, Infosys Corporation, 
Bangalore. 
4. Mr. D.V.S. Raju, CEO, VisualSoft Technologies, Hyderabad. 
5. Mr. Sakthi Sagar, CEO, Wilco International, Hyderabad. 
6. Col. M. Vijay Kumar, Director, Software technology Parks of India, Hyderabad. 
7. Mr. S Ramanathan, CEO, Vanenburg Business IT Solutions, Hyderabad. 
8. Mr. B.V.K. Mohan Reddy, CEO, Infotech Enterprises, Hyderabad. 
9. Mr. Babu Atur, Managing Director, Mantra Broadband Private Limited, Bangalore. 
10. Dr. T. Chokkalingam, MD, Infoniche Technologies Private Limited, Bangalore. 
11. Mr. Vinay L. Deshpande, Chairman and CEO, Encore Software Limited, Bangalore; 
Chairman, Manufacturers Association of IT (MAIIT), India. 
12. Mr. N. Krishnakumar, President, Europe and Asia, MindTree Consulting, Bangalore. 
13. Dr. S. Yegneswar, CEO, Savantech Private Limited, Bangalore. 
14. Mr. Kartik Prabhakara, Board Member, Purple Ace Wireless Solutions, India 
15. Mr. Rajesh Reddy, Co-founder and CEO, July Systems, India 
16. Ms. Nirupama V.G., GM India, Team Lease, Bangalore 
17. Mr. Sabya Shree, Manager, Team Lease, Bangalore 
18. Mr. Srimanto Bhattacharya, Co-founder, Spearhead Services, India 
19. Mr. Chethan Elvis Das, Manager, Pristine Solutions, Bangalore 
20. Mr. Nagendra Siravara, Vice President, Verisign India 
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